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PRIVATE SELECTION FROM PRIVATE CANDIDATES
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Abstract. Differentially Private algorithms often need to select the best amongst many candidate
options. Classical works on this selection problem require that the candidates’ goodness, measured
as a real-valued score function, does not change by much when one person’s data changes. In many
applications such as hyperparameter optimization, this stability assumption is much too strong.
In this work, we consider the selection problem under a much weaker stability assumption on the
candidates, namely that the score functions are differentially private. Under this assumption, we
present algorithms that are near-optimal along the three relevant dimensions: privacy, utility and
computational efficiency.
Our result can be seen as a generalization of the exponential mechanism and its existing gener-
alizations. We also develop an online version of our algorithm, that can be seen as a generalization
of the sparse vector technique to this weaker stability assumption. We show how our results imply
better algorithms for hyperparameter selection in differentially private machine learning, as well as
for adaptive data analysis.
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1. Introduction
Differential Privacy [12] is the standard notion of privacy for statistical databases. It imposes
a probabilistic constraint on the behavior of the algorithm on datasets that differ in one person’s
input. Formally,
Definition 1.1 (Differential Privacy). Let M : Dn → R be a randomized algorithm mapping
datasets to some range R. We say that M is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all pairs of adjacent
datasets D,D′ ∈ Dn, and for all measurable subsets S ⊆ R,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) · Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
Here, two datasets are adjacent if they differ in one person’s input. When δ = 0, we will sometimes
say that M is ε-differentially private.
Differential privacy (DP) satisfies nice post-processing and composition properties, allowing for
complex differentially private algorithms to be built out of simpler building blocks. In the last
decade or so, differentially private algorithms have been designed and analyzed for numerous sta-
tistical and machine learning tasks, in most cases by carefully putting together these building
blocks. This approach to the design and analysis of differentially private algorithms has proven
surprisingly robust and useful.
One of these fundamental building blocks is Differentially Private Selection, which aims to select,
based on a dataset, the best of many options. For concreteness, suppose that we have a score
function q : [K] × Dn → R that maps each of K candidates, and a dataset to a real-valued score.
The DP selection problem is to select amongst these K candidates, one that (approximately)
maximizes this score on a given dataset D ∈ Dn, while ensuring differential privacy.
One can only hope to approximately maximize q when single individuals in the dataset cannot
change any of the score functions q(i, ·) too much. This stability of q under small changes in D
is usually codified in an assumption that each score function q(i,D) is Lipschitz with respect to
Hamming distance 1 changes toD. The Exponential mechanism [26] is an algorithm for DP selection
under this assumption and has found numerous applications to the design of DP mechanisms.
Several other mechanisms for the private selection problem have been proposed, that improve the
utility guarantee under stronger assumptions [3, 7, 27,28,31,33].
In many settings however, the Lipschitzness assumption is much too strong. In this work, we
ask: Are there weaker versions of the stability assumption that allow for private selection? We
show that one can codify the stability simply as differential privacy: the function q, viewed as a
randomized algorithm, satisfies differential privacy. Indeed, one can convert a Lipschitz function q′
into an ε-DP random function q by simply adding, say, a noise drawn from the Laplace distribution
to q′. We assume oracle access to a randomized function that on input (i,D) computes a sample
(x˜, q˜) from the i-th candidate Mi(D), where q˜ is the score and x˜ can be any additional output.
Moreover, the output distributions of Mi(D) and Mi(D′) are promised to be close whenever D
and D′ are neighbors. Here closeness in distributions is taken to mean ε-DP or (ε, δ)-DP. Motivated
by applications, we assume that the scores are bounded, say q˜ ∈ [0, 1].
To measure the quality of a candidate Mi(D), one option is by the median of the distribution:
Median(Mi(D)) := sup
{
τ : Pr(x˜,q˜)∼Mi(D)[q˜ ≥ τ ] ≥ 12
}
. However, even if a candidate Mi is ε1-
DP, its median can still be very sensitive to the dataset. Thus one could only hope to approximately
maximize the median score. Moreover, in many real world applications, one not only wants to find
a “good” candidate, but also get a “good” sample from it, especially because these candidates
themselves are randomized algorithms. Therefore, we use the following non-private algorithm as
our main benchmark: draw a number of samples (x˜j , q˜j) from every candidates, and then output the
one with the highest score q˜j . If one only assumes each candidate is individually ε1-DP, however,
outputting the best of the K˜ options will only be K˜ε1-DP (see Appendix B.1). We would like to
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compete with this naive algortihm, while still preserving O(ε1)-DP. Another important resource
constraint in applications is the computational efficiency of the procedure. In our setting, we would
want to minimize the number of oracle calls to Mi(D) made by our algorithm.
Our first result is a simple algorithm that given as input a threshold τ , outputs a sample (x˜, q˜)
with score q˜ ≥ τ , under the assumption that at least one candidate has a median score of at least
τ . This algorithm makes a near linear number of oracle calls, and improves on the quadratic bound
that follows from a reinterpretation of a result in [19]. We show that the loss in privacy, utility
and efficiency for this algorithm are all close to optimal. Interestingly, this algorithm can be seen
as, starting from a naive differentially private algorithm with a poor utility guarantee (e.g., pick
a candidate uniformly at random), and then by repeating it in a private way to boost its utility
guarantee. In doing so, we get simple algorithms that are both private and have good utility
guarantees.
Theorem 1.2. Fix any ε1 > 0, τ ∈ [0, 1]. Then given ε1-DP algorithms M1, . . . ,MK , there is an
algorithm M that on any dataset D, outputs a sample (x˜, q˜) such that
(a) M is (2ε1)-DP.
(b) q˜ ≥ τ .
(c) Let T˜ be the number of calls the algorithm makes to any Mi(D), and suppose that ∃i :
Prq∼Mi(D)[q ≥ τ ] ≥ 12 , then ET˜ ≤ 2K.
Can we do this without knowing this target value τ? We give two algorithms that compete with
the best i without knowing the target τ . The first can be seen as modifying the naive non-private
algorithm by employing a random stopping strategy. In doing so, it guarantees that “outputting
the highest scored sample seen so far” is already private. However it pays a small additional privacy
penalty: the final privacy cost is 3ε1 instead of 2ε1.
Theorem 1.3. Fix any ε1 > 0, γ ∈ [0, 1]. Then given ε1-DP algorithms M1, . . . ,MK , there is an
algorithm M that on any dataset D, outputs a sample (x˜, q˜) such that
(a) M is (3ε1)-DP.
(b) Let T˜ be the number of calls the algorithm makes to any Mi(D), then ET˜ ≤ 1γ .
(c) q˜ is the highest scored sample among the T˜ samples seen so far.
Our second algorithm keeps the privacy cost to essentially 2ε1, at the cost of a slightly higher
runtime and a more complicated algorithm and analysis. This is valuable since in some settings,
the utility of the base algorithm is quite sensitive with respect to the privacy parameter ε1. In such
settings, with a final target privacy parameter of εfin, the second algorithm can allow us to give
each Mi a privacy budget of ≈ εfin/2, which can lead to a better utility than the ≈ (εfin/3)-DP
Mi’s needed for the first simpler algorithm.
Theorem 1.4. Fix any ε1 > 0, ε0 ∈ [0, 1], β > 0, R ∈ N. Suppose that there are ε1-DP algorithms
M1, . . . ,MK and let τ∗(D) = maxi Median(Mi(D)). There is an algorithmM that on any dataset
D either outputs ⊥, or outputs a sample (x˜, q˜) such that
(a) M is (2ε1 + ε0, δ)-DP.
(b) Except with probability β + δ/R, x˜ has quality at least τ∗ − 1R .
(c) The number of calls T˜ that the algorithm makes to any Mi(D) satisfies (deterministically)
T˜ ≤ O
(
K
(
R+ 1
β2
)6+ 12ε1
ε0
(
ln Rδ
ε20
+
ln 1ε0
β
))
.
Furthermore, Pr[M outputs ⊥] ≤ β + δ.
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In the process, we develop an online version of our algorithm, which can be seen as a gener-
alization of the sparse vector technique [13] to this privacy-instead-of-Lipschitzness setting. This
algorithm takes as input a sequence of mechanismsMi(·) and τi, and stops at the first i such that
Mi(·) has median score larger than τi.
Theorem 1.5. There is an (ε3, δ)-DP mechanism Msv such that, for any p∗ ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1),
and for any sequence of ε1-DP mechanismsM1, · · · ,MK and any sequence of thresholds τ1, · · · , τk:
(a) If there is an i such that Pr[Mi(D) ≥ τi] ≥ p∗, then M outputs i with probability (1− β).
(b) If M outputs i, then except with probability β, Pr[Mi(D) ≥ τi] ≥ ( βK )O(ε1/ε3) · p∗.
Several remarks are in order. First note that the stability assumption that we use, i.e. that of
differential privacy, is in some sense the weakest possible. Indeed if we want the final outcome to
be differentially private and we treat each mechanism as a blackbox, it is easy to see that each
mechanism itself must be differentially private. In other words, we have relaxed the Lipschitzness
condition to the weakest possible condition that would allow for differentially private selection. Our
algorithm suffers a factor of two loss in the privacy parameter. In Appendix D, we show that this
factor of two loss in unavoidable even in simple settings. Note also that our algorithm only makes
O˜(K) oracle calls, whereas even computing the maximum non-privately would require K oracle
calls.
We next outline some motivating applications of our work.
Hyperparameter/algorithm Selection: When designing practical machine learning algorithms,
one often ends up choosing amongst different algorithms/models, or setting values for common
hyperparameters such as the learning rate in an algorithm. This hyperparameter selection problem
has attracted a lot of interest in recent years [35]. Differentially private ML algorithms such
as [1, 30] have many of these hyperparameters, and often add on a few hyperparameters of their
own. A common approach in the non-private setting is to try out several (or all) values of the
hyperparameters and select the best one based on the performance on a validation set. Doing this
with privacy requires more care. Chaudhuri and Vinterbo [9] studied this problem formally under
strong assumptions on the algorithm. These assumptions, however, can be hard to enforce and one
would like to design an algorithm that works without any additional assumptions. Note that given
K choices for the hyperparameters, and an ε-DP learner, one can publish K models and select
the best, say using the exponential mechanism. This approach only gives εK-DP, which allows
for privacy budget of only ε/K (or ε
√
log 1δ/
√
K if using advanced composition) for the learner,
which often translates to significantly poorer utility guarantee. In this setting, note also that each
oracle call is a run of the DP learner for some hyperparameter setting, that can involve a large
computational cost.
Our work shows how to compete with the best choices of hyperparameters in the non-private
setting while satisfying O(ε)-DP, at a small computational overhead.
Adaptive data analysis beyond low-sensitivity queries: One of the applications of DP,
beyond privacy itself, is in understanding overfitting in the adaptive setting where the same dataset
is used in a sequence of analyses, chosen adaptively based on the results of previous ones. This
problem, sometimes referred to as the garden of forking paths [17], can lead to a breakdown of
standard statistical guarantees. A beautiful recent line of work [2,10] shows that when these analyses
take the form of low-sensitivity queries, using differentially private versions of these analyses allows
us to improve the sample complexity quadratically over what would otherwise be possible. Often,
however, the forking paths can involve queries that are not low-sensitivity. For example, at some
step an analyst may choose the best k for k-means clustering or may choose the clustering algorithm
itself amongst one of several. At another step, the analyst may project the data for a carefully
chosen target rank, and may choose to use a projection algorithm such as PCA, or an `p version of
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PCA to get outlier robustness, for a carefully chosen p. Making these choices differentially private
naively would involve paying for the privacy cost of each of the options considered, even though
only one may be used in the subsequent analysis. Our work shows that if one uses a differentially
private algorithm to score each of the options, selecting amongst them can be done while paying the
adaptivity cost of only one query, essentially independently of the number K of options considered.
Generalizing the Exponential Mechanism: Beyond these applications, our result can be
viewed as a generalization of the expoenential mechanism. Given a score fuction q that has sensi-
tivity S, observe that adding Laplace noise of scale S/ε to the score gives us an ε-DP mechanism.
Our algorithm can be then used to select amongst these. We can however relax the assumptions.
If we allow the score functions to have different sensitivities, we can still use our framework and
recover the generalized exponential mechanism of Raskhodnikova and Smith [31]. If the score func-
tions have small smoothed sensitivity [29], we get a smooth sensitivity version of the exponential
mechanism. This last result does not seem to follow from known techniques.
Private amplification for private algorithms: Beyond these applications, our result can be
viewed as an extension of the private amplification scheme introduced in [19]. Given a private
algorithm, which is usually a randomized algorithm, ideally one would like to run it multiple times,
and then choose the best run so as to obtain an output with a higher quality. Here the quality
measure can either be the success probability, or any other utility measure of the output. This is
trivial in the non-private setting. Is it possible to compete with such a naive repetition strategy in
a differentially private way? In this work, we present an algorithm that can be seen as modifying
the naive repetition strategy with a random stopping time, which is arguably almost as competitive
as the non-private naive repetition.
1.1. Other Related Work. The Differentially Private Selection problem, often known as differen-
tially private maximization, is a very general algorithmic problem that arises in many applications.
Some examples include private PAC learning [21], private frequent itemset mining [4], private
PCA [8, 20] and private multiple hypothesis testing [15, 34]. The Sparse Vector Technique can be
viewed in hindsight as a novel solution to the online version of the selection problem, under the
assumption that the target value τ is known in advance. This technique was introduced by Dwork
et al. [13]. We refer the reader to the book by Dwork and Roth [14] for further applications of these
techniques.
Several generalization of the exponential mechanims have been proposed. Smith and Thakurta [33]
and Beimel et al. [3] showed that the utility guarantee can be improved using the propose-test-
release framework of Dwork and Lei [11] when there is a large margin between the maximum and
the rest. Chaudhuri et al. [7] gave an elegant algorithm that can exploit a large margin between
the maximum and the kth maximum for any k. Raskhodnikova and Smith [31] proposed the gen-
eralized exponential mechanism whose utility depends on the sensitivity of the maximizer, rather
than the worst-case sensitivity. Minami et al. [27] show that under certain assumptions on the base
distribution, the sensitivity assumptions on the loss function can be significantly relaxed. Our al-
gorithms can also be seen as a natural generalization of the Laplace mechanism. Given a Lipschitz
score function q′, one can convert it into an ε-DP score function q by adding a Laplace noise. Then
the Laplace mechanism says that one can just output the max of the noise-added scores. However,
the Laplace relies crucially on the fact that the noise is a Laplace noise. As we will discuss in Ap-
pendix B.1, under the mere assumption that the score function is ε-DP, outputting the max will
inevitably incur a factor of K loss in privacy.
The problem of algorithm selection has also been studied in [22] where the best parameters are
learnt from features of the problem. Ligett et al. [24] study the problem of picking from a sequence
of algorithms with increasing privacy costs, until one with good utility is found, for a special class
of mechanisms.
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The problem of private median finding, and more generally private percentile estimation has
been studied in several works [5,11,29,32]. While syntactically similar to the threshold estimation
problem studied in Section 4, the assumptions on the data in those works are very different from
ours and we do not believe that the techniques in those works apply to the setting of interest in
this work.
1.2. Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we present our
algorithm for the known threshold case. Section 4 describes our sparse vector and general selection
algorithms. We sketch applications of our results in Section 5. The appendices contain some
deferred proofs, show why simpler natural approaches do not work for our problem, and show a
lower bound on the privacy overhead.
2. Preliminary and Notations
For a random variable X and distribution Q, we write X ∼ Q if X is distributed according to
the law of Q.
Let D(A‖B) be the max-divergence of two random variables defined as follows:
D(A‖B) = max
S⊆Supp(A)
[
ln
Pr[A ∈ S]
Pr[B ∈ S]
]
.
Then we define Dδ(A‖B) as:
Dδ(A‖B) = max
S⊆Supp(A)
[
ln
Pr[A ∈ S]− δ
Pr[B ∈ S]
]
.
For convenience, for distributionsQ1 andQ2, let q1, q2 be random variables distributed asQ1 andQ2
respectively, then we will also write D(Q1‖Q2) := D(q1‖q2), and similarly Dδ(Q1‖Q2) := Dδ(q1‖q2).
For a distribution Q(D) that depends on datasets D, we say that Q satisfies ε-differential privacy
(or simply written as ε-DP), if for every two neighboring datasets D1, D2, D(Q(D1)‖Q(D2)) ≤ ε.
And we say Q satisfies (ε, δ)-DP if for every two neighboring datasets D1, D2, Dδ(Q(D1)‖Q(D2)) ≤
ε.
Given a function f on dataset D, we say that f is t-Lipschitz if for any two neighboring dataset
D,D′, |f(D)− f(D′)| ≤ t.
3. Private selection
Let {Mi(D)}Ki=1 be a set of differentially private mechanisms, that is, for every i, Mi is a dif-
ferentially private mechanism with respect to the dataset D. We will also refer to the set of Mi
as private candidates. For convenience, we will also treat a randomized mechanism Mi(D) as a
distribution, and write m ∼ Mi(D) if m follows the output distribution of Mi(D). Let {qi} be
scoring functions over the output of these mechanisms, that is, for m ∼ Mi(D), qi(m) is the score
for m. We assume that there is a total ordering of the candidates: when two candidates have the
same score, we assume that there is an arbitrary tie-breaking rule (e.g., by alphabetical ordering).
Given a total ordering of the candidates, without loss of generality we will further assume that each
option has a different score.
The goal of private selection is to select (m, i) that (approximately) maximizes the score of
qi(m). Naively, a natural algorithm is to draw samples mi ∼ Mi for every i, and then output the
pair (mi, i) with the highest score qi(mi). Unfortunately this naive algorithm is not private. The
detailed discussion and analysis is deferred to Appendix B.1. The next natural algorithm would
be to output the p-th percentile best, which unfortunately is also not private. Again we defer the
analysis to Appendix B.3.
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In this section, we will start with the following naive algorithm that is guaranteed to be private
but not very useful (has poor utility guarantee): we choose a candidate i uniformly at random and
output Mi(D). It is not hard to see that such a choice of candidate is at least as private as the
individual candidates. However, the probability of getting a reasonably “good” candidate can be
of the order O(1/K). Nevertheless, we will show how to boost its usefulness (utility guarantee) by
thresholding or random stopping. As a result, this leads to simple and practical algorithms that are
also able to compete with the best candidates in a differentially private way.
Formally, we consider a randomized mechanism Q(D), where every output comes with a utility
score q: (x, q) ∈ Ω × R. For convenience, we will abuse notation and also denote the output
distribution of the randomized mechanism Q(D) by Q(D), and write (x˜, q˜) ∼ Q(D) to indicate
that (x˜, q˜) is obtained by running the randomized mechanism Q(D). Given blackbox access to
Q(D), the goal is to find (x, q) that (approximately) maximizes the score: e.g., they are the top
1%, that is, Pr(x˜,q˜)∼Q(D)[q˜ > q] < 0.01. When it is clear from the context, we will also simply write
q ∼ Q(D) for taking only the q part of the pair (x, q).
To apply this framework to the private selection problem, we define a randomized mechanism
Q(D) as follows: we first sample i ∼ Uniform[K], then sample m ∼Mi(D), and evaluate the score
qi(m), and output ((i,m), qi(m)). The above sampling process implements an oracle access to the
naive algorithm that outputs a candidate uniformly at random. Our goal is to boost the utility of
such a naive algorithm. While our algorithms work for more general distribution of Q(D), where
the candidate i can be drawn from any samplable distribution, we will focus in this work on the
case when i is drawn uniformly from a finite set of candidates (e.g., due to the lack of domain
knowledge). It is also worth noting that if Mi is ε1-DP for every i, then so is Q. Similarly if Mi is
(ε1, δ1)-DP for every i, then so is Q.
3.1. Private selection with a known threshold τ . We consider a thresholding algorithm, which
for a given threshold, repeatedly samples from the candidates until we get one that is above the
threshold. In addition, we have a small probability γ of stopping at each step. See Algorithm 1 for
a more formal description.
Algorithm 1 Thresholding with a known threshold τ .
Input: a threshold τ , a budget γ ≤ 1 and ε0 ≤ 1, number of steps T ≥ max
{
1
γ ln
2
ε0
, 1 + 1eγ
}
, and
sampling access to Q(D).
For j = 1, · · · , T :
• draw (x, q) ∼ Q(D)
• if q ≥ τ then output (x, q) and halt;
• flip a γ-biased coin: with probability γ, output ⊥ and halt;
Output ⊥ and halt.
We assume that the adversary can only observe the final output of the algorithm. We show that
for any choice of parameters, the algorithm is private; and if the given threshold τ is a “good”
threshold, the algorithm is unlikely to output ⊥.
Theorem 3.1. Fix any ε1, δ1 > 0, ε0 ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [0, 1]. Let T be any integer such that T ≥
max
{
1
γ ln
2
ε0
, 1 + 1eγ
}
, Then Algorithm 1 with these parameters satisfies the following:
(a) Let Aout(D) be the output of Algorithm 1, then for q ≥ τ ,
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)] ∝ Pr
(x˜,q˜)∼Q(D)
[(x˜, q˜) = (x, q)].
(b) If Q is ε1-DP, then the output is (2ε1 + ε0)-DP.
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(c) If Q is (ε1, δ1)-DP, then the output is
(
2ε1 + ε0, 3e
2ε1+ε0 · δ1γ
)
-DP.
(d) Let T˜ be the number of iterations of the algorithm, and let p1 = Prq∼Q(D)[q ≥ τ ], then
ET˜ ≤ 1
p1(1− γ) + γ ≤ min
{
1
p1
,
1
γ
}
.
(e) Furthermore, Pr[output ⊥] ≤ (1−p1)(1+ε0/2)p1 γ.
Due to space considerations, we defer this proof to Appendix A.1. As a remark, it is clear that
in the worst case, the number of iterations of Algorithm 1 is no more than T ; this theorem provides
a more average-case guarantee: the larger p1 (or γ) is, the more likely that the algorithm will
terminate (much) sooner than T . Moreover, it is worth noting that the larger the setting of T is,
the smaller we can set ε0, γ, providing more privacy and utility. In particular, the above theorem
holds even if we set γ = 0, ε0 = 0 but T =∞, in other words, we run the algorithm till it stops by
itself. However this would not be a very practical setting: if one started with a “bad” threshold,
the algorithm may never stop. In that case, one may want to stop the algorithm and try a different
threshold. Therefore, for practical purposes one may want to set γ > 0 and ε0 > 0.
3.2. Random stopping without thresholding. In this subsection, we show that the idea of
random stopping leads to a simple private algorithm, even without knowing the threshold. It is
similar to Algorithm 1 but without the thresholding part: draw a random number of samples, and
then output the best option.
Algorithm 2 Outputting the highest score with random stopping.
Input: a budget γ ≤ 1 and the sampling access to Q(D).
Initialize the list (multiset) S = ∅.
For j = 1, · · · ,∞:
• draw (x, q) ∼ Q(D)
• S ← S ∪ {(x, q)}
• flip a γ-biased coin: with probability γ, we output the highest scored candidate from S
and halt;
Theorem 3.2. Fix any ε1 > 0, γ ∈ [0, 1]. If Q is ε1-DP, then the output of Algorithm 2 is (3ε1)-DP.
Proof. We first consider the event of getting the output (x, q) from Algorithm 2 on neighboring
datasets D and D′. Without loss of generality, we assume that each option has a different score.1
Then we denote
p := Pr
q˜∼Q(D)
[q˜ = q] and p′ := Pr
q˜∼Q(D′)
[q˜ = q] ,
p0 := Pr
q˜∼Q(D)
[q˜ > q] and p′0 := Pr
q˜∼Q(D′)
[q˜ > q] ,
p1 := Pr
q˜∼Q(D)
[q˜ ≥ q] and p′1 := Pr
q˜∼Q(D′)
[q˜ ≥ q] .
Notice that p = Pr(x˜,q˜)∼Q(D)[(x˜, q˜) = (x, q)], p1 = p0 + p, and p′1 = p′0 + p′.
We define the highest score for a set (or a multiset) S of tuples (x, q) as
maxS := max
(x,q)∈S
q.
1Otherwise, whenever we write q1 > q, we break ties using the same total ordering of the candidates.
7
Let Aout(D) be the output of Algorithm 2 on D, then we have
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)]
=
∞∑
j=1
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q) ∧ |S| = j]
=
∞∑
j=1
Pr[|S| = j] · Pr[maxS ≤ q, and (x, q) ∈ S | |S| = j]
=
∞∑
j=1
(1− γ)j−1 γ · Pr[maxS ≤ q, and (x, q) ∈ S | |S| = j] .
Then, observe that
Pr[maxS ≤ q | |S| = j] = (1− p0)j ,
and
Pr[(x, q) ∈ S | maxS ≤ q, and |S| = j] = 1−
(
1− p
1− p0
)j
= 1−
(
1− p1
1− p0
)j
.
Together we have
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)] =
∞∑
j=1
(1− γ)j−1 γ · (1− p0)j
(
1−
(
1− p1
1− p0
)j )
=
∞∑
j=1
(1− γ)j−1 γ · ((1− p0)j − (1− p1)j)
=
γ(1− p0)
1− (1− γ)(1− p0) −
γ(1− p1)
1− (1− γ)(1− p1)
=
γ(p1 − p0)
(p0(1− γ) + γ) (p1(1− γ) + γ)
=
γp
(p0(1− γ) + γ) (p1(1− γ) + γ) .
Since Q is ε1-DP, we have that p, p0, p1 are ε1-close (in a DP sense) to p
′, p′0, p′1, respectively. Then,
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)]
Pr[Aout(D′) = (x, q)]
=
p
p′
· p
′
0(1− γ) + γ
p0(1− γ) + γ ·
p′1(1− γ) + γ
p1(1− γ) + γ ≤ exp(3ε1).

The following utility bound holds for this algorithm.
Theorem 3.3. For p > 0, let Q(p)(D) = sup{z : Pr[Q(D) ≥ z] > p}. Then the output of Algo-
rithm 2 has score at least Q(p)(D) except with probability γ/p.
Proof. Let Aout(D) be the output of Algorithm 2 on D, then we write
Pr[Aout(D) < Q
(p)(D)] =
∞∑
j=1
Pr[|S| = j] · Pr
[
maxS < Q(p)(D) | |S| = j
]
=
∞∑
j=1
(1− γ)j−1 γ · (1− p)j
≤ γ/p.
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Instead of random stopping, one can also design a hard stopping variant of this algorithm similar
to that of Algorithm 1, and allow for (ε, δ)-DP input algorithms.
Theorem 3.4. Fix any γ ∈ [0, 1], δ2 > 0 and let T = 1γ log 1δ2 . Consider a variant of Algorithm 2
that outputs the highest scored candidate from S if j reaches T . If Q is (ε1, δ1)-DP, then the output
of this algorithm is (3ε1 + 3
√
2δ1, δ)-DP for δ =
√
2δ1T + δ2.
Proof. We simply reduce to Theorem 3.2 using simple properties of (ε, δ)-DP. We give details
next, using folklore results proven in Appendix E. Fix a pair of neighboring datasets D and D′.
Then we can define an event B such that Pr[B] ≤ √δ1 and that Q(D) | Bc and Q(D′) | Bc are
multiplicatively ε1 +
√
2δ1 close. Let Bj be the event B in the jth call to Q. Further, let C be the
event that the algorithm reaches step T . Conditioned on (∪Tj=1Bj ∪ C)c, the run of this algorithm
can be coupled with a run of Algorithm 2 for a pure DP Q. Further, the probability of the event
∪jBj ∪ C is at most
√
2δ1T + δ2. The claim follows. 
Since δ1 is typically smaller than a polynomial, we have not attempted to optimize the δ term
in this theorem. We conclude with a remark that, in the case when Q satisfies purely ε1-DP, one
can show that the hard stopping variant of Algorithm 2 preserves purely ≈ 3ε1-DP.
Theorem 3.5. Fix any ε0 ∈ (0, 1/2), γ ∈ [0, 1], δ2 > 0 and let T =
⌈
1
γ
(
ln 2(1+γ)
2
ε0γ2
+ ln ln 2(1+γ)
2
ε0γ2
)⌉
.
Consider a variant of Algorithm 2 that outputs the highest scored candidate from S if j reaches T .
If Q is ε1-DP, then the output of this algorithm is (3ε1 + 3ε0)-DP.
The proof of this theorem is quite involved and is deferred to Appendix A.2.
4. Searching for a percentile-threshold: privacy-preserving sparse vector
In this section we consider the problem of searching for a percentile-threshold τ for any given
percentile p∗ in a differentially private way. We start by defining some notations. Given any
sequence of randomized queries {Qi}, we write qi ∼ Qi(D) to indicate that qi is obtained from
running the randomized query Qi on dataset D. In other words, qi ∼ Qi(D) means that qi follows
the output distribution of the randomized query Qi on dataset D. We will treat these Qi(D) as
samplable distributions, where each Qi is ε1-DP. Then for any sequence of thresholds {τi}, and a
target threshold p∗ ∈ (0, 1), we would like to test if Prqi∼Qi(D)[qi ≥ τi] > p∗ and output the first
one that is above the threshold, and in a differentially private way.
It is worth noting that this can be seen as an extension of the standard sparse vector algorithm
for Lipschitz queries: given 1-Lipschitz queries f1, · · · , fk and a threshold τ0, if we set p∗ = 12 ,
Qi = fi +Lap
(
4
ε1
)
and τi = τ0, then it is not hard to check that the queries Qi are now ε1-DP, and
the first query Qi above the percentile-threshold is exactly the same as the first query fi above the
query threshold τ0 (that is, the first fi with median score at least τ0). Answering such a percentile
query exactly is not private (see Appendix B.3 for an example for p∗ = 1/2), so we will have to
relax the goal of finding the first above percentile-threshold query. Similar to the standard setting,
we would like that:
• if a query is much below the threshold, that is, Prqi∼Qi(D)[qi ≥ τi] p∗, then our algorithm
should report “below threshold” (denoted by ⊥);
• if a query is much above the threshold, that is, (1− Prqi∼Qi(D)[qi ≥ τi])  (1− p∗), then
our algorithm should report “above threshold” (denoted by >).
In fact, our algorithm will be a natural extension of the standard sparse vector algorithm.
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4.1. Sparse vector for online private queries with the help of a percentile oracle. To
illustrate ideas, we will start by assuming that we have access to an exact percentile oracle:
p(τi, Qi) := Prqi∼Qi [qi ≥ τi]. As a remark, such a percentile oracle is available in the standard
sparse vector algorithm, which is just the cumulative distribution function of the Laplace dis-
tribution. We observe that if the randomized queries Qi are ε1-DP, then both ln p(τi, Qi) and
ln(1− p(τi, Qi)) are ε1-Lipschitz. In other words, although we no longer have Lipschitzness in the
“answer of a query” space (that is, the quantile space), the fact that each query is ε1-DP will ensure
that we have Lipschitzness in the logarithm of the percentile space (that is, the log of the CDF).
This allows us to adapt the sparse vector algorithm to the log of the percentile space.
Let Φ(x) := x1−x . Note that ln Φ(p(τi, Qi)) is 2ε1-Lipschitz: since both ln p(τi, Qi) and ln(1− p(τi, Qi))
are ε1-Lipschitz, and ln Φ(p(τi, Qi)) is just the difference of two ε1-Lipschitz functions. Also notice
that Φ is a strictly increasing function for x ∈ (0, 1). Given access to the oracle p(τi, Qi), we can
then adapt the sparse vector algorithm as in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 AboveThreshold algorithm assuming the oracle p(τi, Qi).
Input: ε1, ε3, p∗, a stream of thresholds {τi} and randomized queries {Qi(D)}
Sample ν ∼ Lap
(
4ε1
ε3
)
;
For i = 1, · · · :
• let ξi ∼ Lap
(
8ε1
ε3
)
;
• eξi · Φ(p(τi, Qi)) > eνΦ(p∗), output ai = > and halt;
• otherwise output ai = ⊥;
Theorem 4.1. If for every i, Qi is ε1-DP, then
(a) Algorithm 3 is ε3-DP.
(b) Conditional on Algorithm 3 reporting the R-th query QR is “above threshold”, we have that
∀β ∈ (0, 1),Pr
[
Φ(p(τR, QR)) ≤
(
β
R+1
) 12ε1
ε3 Φ(p∗)
]
≤ β. In other words, the algorithm does not
stop too early.
(c) Conditional on Algorithm 3 reporting the R-th query QR is “above threshold”, we have that
∀β ∈ (0, 1),Pr
[
∃i < R : Φ(p(τi, Qi)) ≥
(
R+1
β
) 12ε1
ε3 Φ(p∗)
]
≤ β. In other words, the algorithm
does not stop too late.
(d) ∀β ∈ (0, 1), if for some i, Φ(p(τi, Qi)) ≥
(
1
β
) 12ε1
ε3 Φ(p∗), then Pr[ai = >|∀j < i, aj = ⊥] ≤ β.
In other words, on a query that is way above the threshold the algorithm will likely halt.
Proof. (Sketch) Part (a), part (b) and part (c) all follow from the standard sparse vector anal-
ysis (see, e.g., [14]), and the fact that ln Φ(p(τi, Qi)) is 2ε1-Lipschitz. Observe that the test
eξi · Φ(p(τi, Qi)) > eνΦ(p∗) is equivalent to ξi + ln Φ(p(τi, Qi)) > ν + ln Φ(p∗). Therefore, if we
view ln Φ(p(τi, Qi)) as the i-th query (which is 2ε1-Lipschitz) and ln Φ(p∗) as the threshold, then
this is indeed the standard sparse vector setting. The details are omitted here as we will see proofs
for stronger claims for the actual algorithm in Theorem 4.4.
For part (d), observe that the test eξi · Φ(p(τi, Qi)) > eνΦ(p∗) will pass if ξi ≥ −8ε1ε3 ln 1β and
ν ≤ 4ε1ε3 ln 1β . By a union bound, with probability at least 1−β, both will happen at the same time.
In other words, the probability of not halting after seeing a query way above the threshold is at
most β. 
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We give some estimates in the special case of p∗ = 1/2, which corresponds to the range of the
standard sparse vector setting, as quick corollaries. In fact, if one apply this to the standard sparse
vector setting, one can recover guarantees that match the standard setting up to constant factors.
Corollary 4.2. If p∗ = 1/2, and for every i, Qi is ε1-DP, then
(a) Algorithm 3 is ε3-DP.
(b) Conditional on Algorithm 3 reporting the R-th query QR is “above threshold”, we have that
∀β ∈ (0, 1),Pr
[
p(τR, QR) ≤ β
12ε1
ε3
β
12ε1
ε3 +(R+1)
12ε1
ε3
]
≤ β. In other words, the algorithm does not stop
too early.
(c) Conditional on Algorithm 3 reporting the R-th query QR is “above threshold”, we have that
∀β ∈ (0, 1),Pr
[
∃i < R : p(τi, Qi) ≥ (R+1)
12ε1
ε3
β
12ε1
ε3 +(R+1)
12ε1
ε3
]
≤ β. In other words, the algorithm does
not stop too late.
(d) ∀β ∈ (0, 1), if for some i, p(τi, Qi) ≥ 1− β
12ε1
ε3
1+β
12ε1
ε3
, then Pr[ai = >|∀j < i, aj = ⊥] ≤ β. In other
words, the algorithm will likely halt on a query that is way above the threshold.
4.2. Sparse vector for online private queries. Next we show that one could replace the exact
percentile oracles p(τi, Qi(D)) with unbiased estimators p˜i. Assuming that we have unlimited
access to the randomized queries {Qi(D)}, we consider the following natural unbiased estimator
for p(τi, Qi(D)): given iid samples qi,1, · · · , qi,N , where for each j, qi,j ∼ Qi(D), we define p˜i :=
1
N
∑N
j=1[qi,j ≥ τi], where [qi,j ≥ τi] is the Iverson bracket defined by
[a ≥ b] :=
{
1, if a ≥ b,
0, otherwise.
Since p˜i is now a random function of the dataset, the usual Lipschitzness is not well-defined,
unlike for the function p(τi, Qi(D)). One approach of defining “Lipschitzness” for such a random
function would be to consider the earth mover distance. This is what we will do next.
Let p˜i
′ be the analogous unbiased estimator for p(τi, Qi(D′)) on a neighboring dataset D′. By
ε1-DP of Qi, we have that
Ep˜i = p(τi, Qi(D)) ≤ eε1p(τi, Qi(D′)) = eε1Ep˜i′.
In order to adapt Algorithm 3, ideally we would like a probabilistic version of p˜i ≤ eε1 p˜i′ to be
true: if there is a coupling between p˜i and p˜i
′ such that
∣∣ln p˜i − ln p˜i′∣∣ ≤ ε1, then we can replace
p(τi, Qi(D)) with p˜i in Algorithm 3. This turns out to be too much to ask for in such a general
setting. We show in Lemma 4.3 that a slightly weaker statement in indeed true. This is the key
lemma that leads us to Algorithm 4.
Lemma 4.3. Let {X1, · · · , Xn} and {Y1, · · · , Yn} be two sequences of independent {0, 1} random
variables, and let X =
∑n
i=1Xi, Y =
∑n
i=1 Yi. For any fixed ε1 ∈ (0, 1), ε0 ∈ (0, 1), δ0 ∈ (0, 1), let
C = 2(eε0+ε1 + 1 + eε0/2) < 21.
If EX ≤ eε1EY , then under the trivial (independent) coupling between X and Y ,
Pr
[
X ≥ eε1+ε0 · Y + C
ε0
· ln 2
δ0
]
≤ δ0.
Equivalently, if we let ∆ :=
C ln 2
δ0
ε0(eε0+ε1−1) = O
(
1
ε20
ln 1δ0
)
, then
Pr
[
X + ∆ ≥ eε1+ε0 · (Y + ∆) ] ≤ δ0.
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We defer the proof of this lemma to Appendix A.3. Now we are ready to describe the extended
version of the AboveThreshold algorithm. We now consider a potential function Φ(N,∆)(x) =
Nx+∆
N(1−x)+∆ . As an intuition, we will see that thanks to Lemma 4.3, if Qi is ε1-DP, then for suitable
choices of ε0 and ∆, there exists a coupling in which, with high probability, ln Φ
(N,∆)(p˜i) is 2(ε0+ε1)-
Lipschitz.
Algorithm 4 The ExtendedAboveThreshold algorithm.
Input: T, δ, ε0, ε1, ε3, β, p∗, a stream of thresholds {τi} and randomized queries {Qi(D)}.
Set S = 2(ε1 + ε0), ∆ =
C ln 8T
δ
ε0(eε0+ε1−1) , and N =
eε0∆
min{p∗,1−p∗}
(
T+1
β
) 6S
ε3
Sample ν ∼ Lap
(
2S
ε3
)
For i = 1, · · · , T :
• draw iid samples {qi,1, · · · , qi,N} ∼ QNi
• let p˜i := 1N
∑N
j=1[qi,j ≥ τi]
• sample ξi ∼ Lap
(
4S
ε3
)
• if exp(ξi) · Φ(N,∆)(p˜i) ≥ exp(ν) · Φ(N,∆)(p∗): output ai = > and halt
• otherwise output ai = ⊥
Theorem 4.4. For any fixed ε0 ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1) and an integer T > 1, let S =
2(ε1 + ε0), C = 2(e
ε0+ε1 + 1 + eε0/2) < 21, and ∆ =
C ln 8T
δ
ε0(eε0+ε1−1) = O
(
1
ε20
ln Tδ
)
. If for every i, Qi
is ε1-DP, then:
(a) Algorithm 4 with the above parameters is (ε3, δ)-DP.
(b) Conditional on Algorithm 4 reporting the R-th query QR is “above threshold”, we have that
∀β ∈ (0, 1),Pr
[
Φ(N,∆)(p(τR, QR)) ≤
(
β
R+1
) 6S
ε3 · e−ε0 · Φ(N,∆)(p∗)
]
≤ β + δ/2. In other words,
the algorithm does not stop too early. Moreover,
Pr
[
p(τR, QR) ≤ 1
2
e−ε0
(
β
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3
p∗
]
≤ β + δ/2.
(c) Conditional on Algorithm 4 reporting the R-th query QR is “above threshold”, we have that
∀β ∈ (0, 1),Pr
[
∃i < R : Φ(N,∆)(p(τi, Qi)) ≥
(
R+1
β
) 6S
ε3 · eε0 · Φ(N,∆)(p∗)
]
≤ β + δ/2. In other
words, the algorithm does not stop too late. Moreover,
Pr
p(τR, QR) ≥ 1−(1 + eε0
2(1− p∗)
(
R+ 1
β
) 6S
ε3
)−1  ≤ β + δ/2.
(d) ∀β ∈ (0, 1), if for some i, Φ(N,∆)(p(τi, Qi)) ≥ eε0
(
1
β
) 6S
ε3 Φ(N,∆)(p∗), then
Pr[ai = >|∀j < i, aj = ⊥] ≤ β + δ
4T
.
In other words, on a query that is way above the threshold the algorithm will likely halt.
Before proving the theorem, we state the following sufficient condition for establishing (ε, δ)-DP.
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Lemma 4.5. Let X and Y be two random variables that share the same sample space and σ-algebra,
If there exists constants δ > 0, ε > 0, and for any event A, there exists a joint event G := G(X,Y )
on X and Y such that Pr[G] ≥ 1− δ, and
e−ε Pr[Y ∈ A|G] ≤ Pr[X ∈ A|G] ≤ eε Pr[Y ∈ A|G],
then, X and Y also satisfies that
e−ε(Pr[Y ∈ A]− δ) ≤ Pr[X ∈ A] ≤ eε Pr[Y ∈ A] + δ.
Informally, in order to show (ε, δ)-DP, it suffices to construct a coupling where, except with
probability δ, the two neighboring distributions satisfy ε-DP. It is worth noting that X and Y need
not be independent. Thus one could optimize δ by constructing a coupling between X and Y that
maximizes Pr[G]. In addition, we note that the design of G and the coupling between X and Y can
be dependent on the event A.
Proof. For the first inequality,
Pr[X ∈ A] ≥Pr[X ∈ A|G] · Pr[G]
≥e−ε Pr[Y ∈ A|G] · Pr[G]
=e−ε
(
Pr[Y ∈ A]− Pr[Y ∈ A,G] )
≥e−ε(Pr[Y ∈ A]− Pr[G] )
≥e−ε(Pr[Y ∈ A]− δ) .
For the second inequality,
Pr[X ∈ A] = Pr[X ∈ A,G] + Pr[X ∈ A,G]
≤Pr[X ∈ A|G] · Pr[G] + Pr[G]
≤eε Pr[Y ∈ A|G] · Pr[G] + δ
≤eε Pr[Y ∈ A] + δ.

Finally we prove Theorem 4.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. For part (a), we follow the standard analysis of sparse vector. Fix any two
neighboring datasets D and D′. By Lemma 4.5, in order to show (ε3, δ)-DP, it suffices to find a
conditioning event G, and a coupling between the output distribution of Algorithm 4 running on D
and D′, such that they are ε3-close except with probability δ. Observe that in order to obtain the
same output, it suffices if we can couple all the noisy tests of the form eξi ·Φ(N,∆)(p˜i) ≥ eνΦ(N,∆)(p∗).
These tests depend only on two types of randomness: the perturbations to the current percentile
(in the form of ξi), and the perturbations to the desired percentile (in the form of ν). We denote
these randomness by {ξi} and ν when running on dataset D , and by {ξ′i} and ν ′ when running on
D′.
We consider the event that aR = > and ∀i < R, ai = ⊥. Let Φ∗ := Φ(N,∆)(p∗), and
Φi := Φ
(N,∆)(p˜i) and Φ
′
i := Φ
(N,∆)
(
p˜i
′) ,
g := max
i<R
{
eξi · Φi
}
and g′ := max
i<R
{
eξi · Φ′i
}
.
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Now we are ready to specify the coupling. Given {ξi} and ν, we let ν ′ = ν + ln g′g , and ξ′i ={
ξi, if i < R
ξR + ln
g′
g + ln
ΦR
Φ′R
, if i = R
. Then, it is not hard to check that under this coupling,
g < eνΦ∗ ⇐⇒ g′ < eν′Φ∗,
eξRΦR ≥ eνΦ∗ ⇐⇒ eξ′RΦR ≥ eν′Φ∗.
In the following we will abuse notation, and write PrLap[ξR] to denote the probability density
function of the Laplace distribution. Then, let ai be the i-th output of the algorithm running on
dataset D, and a′i be that of D
′.
Pr[aR = >]
Pr[a′R = >]
=
Pr
[
g < eνΦ∗ ∧ eξRΦR ≥ eνΦ∗
]
Pr
[
g′ < eν′Φ∗ ∧ eξ′RΦR ≥ eν′Φ∗
]
=
∫
R
∫
R Pr
[
g < eνΦ∗ ∧ eξRΦR ≥ eνΦ∗ | ξR, ν
] · PrLap[ξR] · PrLap[ν] dν dξR∫
R
∫
R Pr
[
g′ < eν′Φ∗ ∧ eξ′RΦR ≥ eν′Φ∗ | ξ′R, ν ′
]
· PrLap[ξ′R] · PrLap[ν ′] dν ′ dξ′R
≤ sup
ξ,ν
PrLap[ξR] · PrLap[ν]
PrLap[ξ′R] · PrLap[ν ′]
, by the coupling between ξR, ξ
′
R and ν, ν
′.
Therefore, it remains to bound |ξR − ξ′R| and |ν − ν ′|, which depends on the randomness involved
in the probabilistic queries Φi and Φ
′
i. Thus we need to couple Φi and Φ
′
i. For the given ε1, ε0
(as specified in the theorem statement), we let δ0 = δ/T , X1 = Np˜i, and Y1 = Np˜i
′. Recall that
e−ε1EY1 ≤ EX1 ≤ eε1EY1, then by Lemma 4.3, X1 and Y1 under the trivial coupling satisfies:
Pr
[
X1 + ∆ ≥ eε1+ε0 · (Y1 + ∆)
] ≤ δ
4T
,
Pr
[
Y1 + ∆ ≥ eε1+ε0 · (X1 + ∆)
] ≤ δ
4T
.
Similarly if we let X2 = N(1− p˜i) and Y2 = N(1− p˜i′), then under the trivial coupling,
Pr
[
X2 + ∆ ≥ eε1+ε0 · (Y2 + ∆)
] ≤ δ
4T
,
Pr
[
Y2 + ∆ ≥ eε1+ε0 · (X2 + ∆)
] ≤ δ
4T
.
We consider the following conditioning event:
G :=
{
∀i ∈ [R],
∣∣∣∣ln(Np˜i′ + ∆Np˜i + ∆
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε1 + ε0 and ∣∣∣∣ln(N(1− p˜i′) + ∆N(1− p˜i) + ∆
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε1 + ε0} .
By a union bound, we have Pr[G] ≥ 1− δ. Conditional on G, by triangle inequality we have:
∀i ∈ [R],
∣∣∣∣ln ΦiΦ′i
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ln(Np˜i′ + ∆Np˜i + ∆
)∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ln(N(1− p˜i′) + ∆N(1− p˜i) + ∆
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(ε1 + ε0) = S.
In other words, conditional on G,∣∣ν − ν ′∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ln g′g
∣∣∣∣ ≤ maxi<R
∣∣∣∣ln ΦiΦ′i
∣∣∣∣ ≤ S∣∣ξR − ξ′R∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ln g′g
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ln ΦRΦ′R
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 maxi≤R
∣∣∣∣ln ΦiΦ′i
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2S.
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Now we are ready to bound
Pr[aR = > | G]
Pr[a′R = > | G]
≤ PrLap[ξR] · PrLap[ν]
PrLap[ξR ± 2S] · PrLap[ν ± S] ≤ exp(ε3).
where the last inequality uses the probability density function of the two Laplace distributions.
Finally consider the event that R = T and ai = ⊥ for all i ∈ [T ], by a similar argument we have
Pr[aT = ⊥ | G]
Pr[a′T = ⊥ | G]
=
Pr[g < eνΦ∗ | G]
Pr[g′ < eν′Φ∗ | G] ≤
PrLap[ξR]
PrLap[ξR ± 2S] ≤ exp(ε3).
Since our choice of R is arbitrary, this shows that conditioned on G, we have ε3-DP for the output
of our algorithm. Since Pr[G] ≥ 1 − δ, by Lemma 4.5 this concludes (ε3, δ)-DP for the output
unconditionally.
For part (b), we consider the events of non-concentration:
F1 :=
{
ν : |ν| ≥ 2S
ε3
ln
R+ 1
β
}
F2 :=
{
ξ1, · · · , ξR : ∃i ∈ [R], |ξi| ≥ 4S
ε3
ln
R+ 1
β
}
F3 :=
{
p˜1, · · · , p˜R : ∃i ∈ [T ],Φ(N,∆)(p˜i) > eε0 · Φ(N,∆)(Ep˜i)
}
.
Then similar to part (a) we have
Pr[F1 ∪ F2 ∪ F3] ≤ Pr[F1] + Pr[F2] + Pr[F3] ≤ β
R+ 1
+R
β
R+ 1
+ 2R
δ
4T
≤ β + δ/2,
where the bounds for F1 and F2 follows directly from CDF of the Laplace distribution, and the
bound for F3 follows from a concentration bound (see Lemma A.4). Therefore, conditional on
avoiding F1 ∪ F2, if the algorithm stops at the k-th iteration, we have that
exp(ξk) · Φ(N,∆)(p˜k) ≥ exp(ν) · Φ(N,∆)(p∗) =⇒ Φ(N,∆)(p˜k) ≥
(
β
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3 · Φ(N,∆)(p∗).
Next, conditioning further on avoiding F3, we have that
Φ(N,∆)(p˜k) ≤ eε0Φ(N,∆)(Ep˜k)
=⇒ Φ(N,∆)(Ep˜k) ≥ e−ε0 · Φ(N,∆)(p˜k) ≥ e−ε0
(
β
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3 · Φ(N,∆)(p∗).
Let N ≥ eε0∆p∗
(
T+1
β
) 6S
ε3 , then we have
Φ(N,∆)(p∗) =
p∗ + ∆/N
1− p∗ + ∆/N ≥ 2p∗,
=⇒ Φ(N,∆)(Ep˜k) ≥ 2e−ε0
(
β
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3
p∗,
=⇒ p(τk, Qk) = Ep˜k ≥
e−ε0
(
β
R+1
) 6S
ε3 p∗
1 + e−ε0
(
β
R+1
) 6S
ε3 p∗
≥ 1
2
e−ε0
(
β
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3
p∗.
This concludes the proof.
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For part (c), it will be similar to part (b), except that we consider
F3 :=
{
p˜1, · · · , p˜R : ∃i ∈ [R],Φ(N,∆)(p˜i) < e−ε0 · Φ(N,∆)(Ep˜i)
}
.
As before we still have
Pr[F1 ∪ F2 ∪ F3] ≤ Pr[F1] + Pr[F2] + Pr[F3] ≤ β
R+ 1
+R
β
R+ 1
+ 2R
δ
4R
≤ β + δ/2.
Then, conditioning on avoiding F1,F2,F3, we have that
Φ(N,∆)(Ep˜k) ≤ eε0 · Φ(N,∆)(p˜k) ≤ eε0
(
R+ 1
β
) 6S
ε3 · Φ(N,∆)(p∗).
Let N ≥ eε0∆1−p∗
(
T+1
β
) 6S
ε3 , then we have
Φ(N,∆)(p∗) =
p∗ + ∆/N
1− p∗ + ∆/N ≤
1
2(1− p∗) ,
=⇒ Φ(N,∆)(Ep˜k) ≤ e
ε0
2(1− p∗)
(
R+ 1
β
) 6S
ε3
,
=⇒ p(τk, Qk) = Ep˜k ≤ 1−
(
1 +
eε0
2(1− p∗)
(
R+ 1
β
) 6S
ε3
)−1
.
For part (d), observe that the test exp(ξi) · Φ(N,∆)(p˜i) ≥ exp(ν) · Φ(N,∆)(p∗) will pass if ξi ≥
−4Sε3 ln 1β , ν ≤ 2Sε3 ln 1β , and Φ(N,∆)(p˜i) ≥ e−ε0/2Φ(N,∆)(Ep˜i). Similar to part (b) and (c), we get that
this will happen except with probability β + δ4T .

4.3. A more efficient sparse vector for a one-sided guarantee. In this subsection we consider
searching for the unknown “good” threshold τ for Algorithm 1 in a more efficient yet private way.
The idea is that, instead of trying to tackle adversarily chosen randomized online queries, here we
design better queries for our algorithm.
Specifically, let Q(D) be a distribution dependent on dataset D, and let q ∼ Q. Let p(τ,Q) :=
Prq∼Q[q ≥ τ ]. Then, given p∗ ∈ (0, 1), our goal is to find τ∗ := max {τ : p(τ,Q) ≥ p∗} in a
differentially private way.
Since τ∗ can be very sensitive for neighboring datasets (see Appendix B.3 for an example for
p∗ = 1/2), outputting τ∗ directly would not be private. The relaxed goal is to find, with high
probability, a private threshold τ˜ so that:
τ˜ is almost as large as τ∗, and p(τ˜ , Q) is not much smaller than p∗.
It is worth noting that, due to the one-sided nature of our goal (instead of asking p(τ˜ , Q) to be
close to p∗, we only want p(τ˜ , Q) to be not much smaller than p∗), we find it much more convenient
to shift the target by a constant factor: from p∗ to a smaller target ≈ β
6ε1
ε3 · p∗. Such a tradeoff
enables us to find a τ˜ that is closer to τ∗, at the cost of a potentially smaller p(τ˜ , Q). In the settings
that we consider, a higher τ˜ allows for better “quality” of the selected candidate, while a larger p∗
is usually only for smaller computational cost.
Theorem 4.6. Let Q be a ε1-DP distribution. For any fixed ε0 ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1) and an
integer R > 1, let S = ε1 + ε0, C = 2(e
ε0+ε1 + 1 + eε0/2) < 21, and ∆ =
C ln 4R
δ
ε0(eε0+ε1−1) = O
(
1
ε20
ln Rδ
)
.
Then the following holds for the output τ˜ of Algorithm 5 with the above parameters:
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Algorithm 5 The FindPercentileThreshold algorithm.
Input: R, δ, ε0, ε1, ε3, β, p∗, and sampling access to Q(D).
Set S = ε1 + ε0, ∆ =
C ln 4R
δ
ε0(eε0+ε1−1) , N =
3∆eε0/2
p∗ · β
−12S
ε3 (R+ 1)
6S
ε3 , and Λ = ε02 +
6S
ε3
ln 1β
Sample ν ∼ Lap
(
2S
ε3
)
, and draw iid samples {q1, · · · , qN} ∼ QN
For i = 1, · · · , R:
• let τi = 1− i−1R−1
• let p˜i := 1N
∑N
j=1[qi ≥ τi]
• sample ξi ∼ Lap
(
4S
ε3
)
• if exp(ξi) · (Np˜i + ∆) ≥ exp(ν − Λ) · (Np∗ + ∆):
– output τi and halt
(a) τ˜ is (ε3, δ)-DP.
(b) the algorithm does not stop too early:
Pr
[
p(τ˜ , Q) ≤ e
−ε0/2
3
(
β2
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3 · p∗
]
≤ β + δ/2.
(c) Pr
[
τ˜ ≤ τ∗ − 1R
] ≤ 2β + δ2R . In other words, the algorithm does not stop too late.
Proof. (Sketch) For part (a), this basically follows from the same proof of Theorem 4.4 part (a),
except the following changes:
• We consider Φ(N,∆)(x) = Nx+∆. It is not hard to see that the proof only relies on the fact
that Φ(N,∆)(x) is monotone, and Φ(N,∆)(p˜i) can be coupled with Φ
(N,∆)
(
p˜i
′)multiplicatively.
• Here we can re-use randomness, due to the fact that we essentially have the same distribu-
tion, and only need to change τi. It is worth noting that we did not require independence
of the {p˜i} since we only used union bound.
• We have also shifted the target of Φ(N,∆)(p∗) multiplicatively. However it does not affect
privacy, since one can view such a shift as considering a different p∗ to begin with.
For part (b), similarly we consider the events of non-concentration:
F1 :=
{
ν : |ν| ≥ 2S
ε3
ln
R+ 1
β
}
F2 :=
{
ξ1, · · · , ξR : ∃i ∈ [R], |ξi| ≥ 4S
ε3
ln
R+ 1
β
}
F3 :=
{
p˜1, · · · , p˜R : ∃i ∈ [R], Np˜i + ∆ > eε0/2(Np(τi, Q) + ∆)
}
.
Then we have
Pr[F1 ∪ F2 ∪ F3] ≤ Pr[F1] + Pr[F2] + Pr[F3] ≤ β
R+ 1
+R
β
R+ 1
+R
δ
2R
≤ β + δ/2,
where the bounds for F1 and F2 follows directly from CDF of the Laplace distribution, and the
bound for F3 follows from a concentration bound (see Lemma A.4). Therefore, conditional on
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avoiding F1 ∪ F2, if the algorithm stops at the k-th iteration, we have that
exp(ξk) · (Np˜k + ∆) ≥ exp(ν − Λ) · (Np∗ + ∆)
=⇒
(
R+ 1
β
) 4S
ε3 · (Np˜k + ∆) ≥
(
β
R+ 1
) 2S
ε3 · β 6Sε3 · e−ε0/2 · (Np∗ + ∆)
=⇒ Np˜k ≥
(
1
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3
β
12S
ε3 ·Np∗ −∆.
Set N = 3∆e
ε0/2
p∗ · β
−12S
ε3 (R+ 1)
6S
ε3 , then we have
Np˜k ≥ 2∆eε0/2 = 2
3
(
1
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3
β
12S
ε3 ·Np∗.(1)
Next, conditioning further on avoiding F3, we have that
Np˜k + ∆ ≤ eε0/2(Np(τ˜ , Q) + ∆)
=⇒ Np(τ˜ , Q) ≥ e−ε0/2Np˜k −∆ ≥ ∆ = e
−ε0/2
3
(
1
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3
β
12S
ε3 ·Np∗
=⇒ p(τ˜ , Q) ≥ e
−ε0/2
3
(
1
R+ 1
) 6S
ε3
β
12S
ε3 · p∗.
This concludes the proof.
For part (c), as soon as τi ≤ τ∗, we have p(τi, Q) ≥ p∗. Therefore the test exp(ξi) · (Np˜i + ∆) ≥
exp(ν − Λ)·(Np∗+∆) will pass if ξi ≥ −4Sε3 ln 1β , ν ≤ 2Sε3 ln 1β , and Np˜i+∆ ≥ e−ε0/2(Np(τi, Q) + ∆).
Similar to part (b), we get that this will happen except with probability 2β + δ2R . In other words,
the probability of not halting after the first iteration with τi ≤ τ∗ is at most 2β + δ2R . 
Finally, by combining Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 3.1, we get the following:
Theorem 4.7. Fix any ε1 > 0, ε0 ∈ [0, 1], β > 0, R ∈ N. Suppose that there are ε1-DP algorithms
M1, . . . ,MK and let τ∗(D) = maxi Median(Mi(D)). There is an algorithmM that on any dataset
either outputs ⊥, or selects an i and a sample x from Mi(D) such that (a) M is (2ε1 + ε0, δ)-DP,
(b) Except with probability β + δ/R, x has quality at least τ∗ − 1R , (c) The number of calls T˜ that
the algorithm makes to any Mi(D) satisfies
ET˜ ≤ O
(
K
(
R+ 1
β2
)6+ 12ε1
ε0
(
ln Rδ
ε20
+
1
β
))
; T˜ ≤ O
(
K
(
R+ 1
β2
)6+ 12ε1
ε0
(
ln Rδ
ε20
+
ln 1ε0
β
))
.
Furthermore, Pr[Moutputs ⊥] ≤ β + δ.
Here we set p1 =
1
12K ·
(
β2
R+1
)6+ 12ε1
ε0 , and γ = p1β, ε3 = ε0.
5. Applications
5.1. Hyperparameter selection. Suppose that we are given K choices of hyperparameters, and
for each choice i ∈ [K], there is a differentially private learning algorithm Mi. Given a training
dataset D1, Mi(D1) is a randomized mechanism that returns a model, which we often denote
as m. Next, for a validation dataset D2, we let q˜i(m,D2) be the validation score of model m
and hyperparameter i. Then the goal of hyperparameter selection is to find a pair (m, i∗), that
approximately maximizes the validation score.
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It is worth noting that the dependencies on the validation set are only through the scoring
functions q˜i, which are usually counting queries and thus have small sensitivity. This is the setting
we will consider. Therefore, we let qi := q˜i + Lap
(
1
nε2
)
, where n is the size of the validation set.
Then, we define Qi(D1, D2) to be the distribution of qi(m,D2) when m ∼Mi(D1). Finally we let
Q be the distribution of Qi when we draw i uniformly from [K].
Then, in order to apply Theorem 4.7 or Theorem 3.2, it remains to verify that Q is differentially
private with respect to both datasets.
Lemma 5.1. The distribution Q(D1, D2) defined as above is always ε2-DP for the validation set
D2. Moreover:
if {Mi}Ki=1 are ε1-DP learning algorithms, then Q(D1, D2) is ε1-DP for the training set D1;
if {Mi}Ki=1 are (ε1, δ1)-DP learning algorithms, then Q(D1, D2) is (ε1, δ1)-DP for D1.
Proof. First for D2, notice that for neighboring D2 and D
′
2, q˜i changes by at most 1/n, thus
∀m ∈ Supp {Mi} and ∀t, ξ ∈ R, there exists ν : |ν − ξ| ≤ 1/n such that
Pr
[
qi(m,D
′
2) = t
]
= Pr
[
q˜i(m,D
′
2) + ξ = t
]
= Pr[ξ = t− q˜i(m,D′2)],
Pr[qi(m,D2) = t] = Pr[q˜i(m,D2) + ν = t] = Pr[ν = t− q˜i(m,D2)].
It is worth noting that this holds for every m in the support. Then ε2-DP for D2 follows from the
fact that ξ and ν follow the same Lap
(
1
nε2
)
distribution and |ξ − ν| ≤ 1/n.
Then for D1, note that the dependency of Qi on D1 is only through Mi(D), which is ε1-DP.
Thus for every i, Qi(D1, D2) is ε1-DP for D1, thus Q is also ε1-DP for D1.
Similarly ifMi(D) is (ε1, δ1)-DP, we have that for every i, Qi(D1, D2) is (ε1, δ1)-DP for D1, thus
Q is also (ε1, δ1)-DP for D1. 
5.2. Adaptive Data Analsis Beyond Low Sensitivity Queries. Our results immediately have
applications to designing differentially private algorithms where interemediate steps select the best
amongst various private options. Since DP allows us to prove generalization bounds, these results
have implications for adaptive data analysis too.
As an example, consider a data analysis algorithm which as an intermediate step runs k-means
clustering (or rank-k PCA). Often in practice, one tries several values of k and picks the best one
according to some criteria (see e.g. Garg and Kalai [16]). While there are differentially private
variants of the base problem of k-means, naively selecting the best would require us to account
for the privacy cost of computing all the k-means objectives, for different value of k. Theorem 4.7
allows us to select the best of these without any asymptotic overhead in privacy cost.
5.3. Generalizations of the Exponential Mechanism. The exponential mechanism solves the
selection problem when the score functions are Lipschitz. Several variants of the Exponential
Mechanism have been proposed in previous work. We next show that several of these can be
derived as corollaries of our main result, by defining appropriate private variants of the score
function.
Theorem 5.2. Let {qi(·)}Ki=1 be a set of score functions mapping datasets to reals. Let i?(D) =
arg maxi qi(D) and q
?(D) = maxi qi(D).
Exponential Mechanism: Suppose that each qi has sensitivity at most s. Then there is an
ε-DP mechanism that outputs an i such that qi(D) ≥ q?(D) − O(s log Kβ /ε) except with
probability β.
Generalized Exponential Mechanism [31]: Suppose that qi has sensitivity at most si.
Then there is an (ε, δ)-DP mechanism that outputs an i such that qi(D) ≥ q?(D)−O(si? log Kβ /ε)
except with probability β.
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Margin-based Mechanism Adist [3, 33]: Suppose that each qi has sensitivity at most s.
There is an (ε, δ)-DP mechanism M that outputs i? except with probability β whenever
q? ≥ qi + Ω(s log 1βδ/ε) for all i 6= i?.
Generalized Smooth Sensitivity Exponential Mechanism: Suppose that qi has
(
ε/(4 ln 2δ )
)
-
smoothed sensitivity at most si. Then there is an (ε, δ)-DP mechanism that outputs an i
such that qi(D) ≥ q?(D)−O(si? log Kβ /ε) except with probability β.
Proof. For the first part, let Mi(D) =
(
i, qi(D) + Lap(
s
ε)
)
. Then applying Theorem 3.2, we get
an outcome with score at least q?(D) except with probability β (by setting γ = β/K). Since
the number of runs of any qi is at most O˜(K/β) (except with probability β), the largest of the
Laplacian r.v.’s is bounded by O( s log(K/β)ε ). This implies that qi(D) where i is the option chosen
by the algorithm is at lest q?(D)−O( s log(K/β)ε ).
The second part is similar, except that we set Mi(D) =
(
i, qi(D)− 2si logK/βε + Lap( siε )
)
. This
shift ensures the realized score is no larger than qi(D) for all calls to Mi(D). Now the median of
Mi? is at least q?(D)−−2si? logK/βε , which implies the claim.
For the third part, consider the truncated Laplace distribution TLap(T )(λ) that samples from
the Laplace distribution with parameter λ, conditioned on the output being in [−Tλ, Tλ]. It
can be checked [18] that the mechanism Mi(D) = qi(D) + TLap(log 1δ )( sε) satisfies (ε, δ)-DP when
ε < 1, δ < 1/4. The claim follows by applying Theorem 3.4.
The fourth part is similar to the Generalized exponential mechanism, except that we add noise
from smooth-sensitivity-scaled Laplacian distribution using the Smoothed Sensitivity framework
of [29, Cor. 2.4]. As long as η > ε/ log(K/β) (which is ensured when we set η = ε/4 ln 2δ )
with δ < β/K), it can be verified that the 2si is a smooth upper bound on the sensitivity of
qi(D)− 2si? logK/βε . The claim follows by a simple computation. 
5.4. Private Amplification. Gupta et al. [19] study the question of private amplification: given
a DP algorithm that gets a certain utility in expectation, can we convert it into one that gets
close to that utility with high probabilty? Their motivation came from combinatorial optimization
problems, where they showed appoximation algorithms with certain guarantees in expectation.
Using Markov’s inequality, one can convert the expectation guarantee to one that ensures a utility
bound with some probability p. Applying our results, one gets an algorithm that ensures that
utility with high probability. This improves on the private amplification theorem proven in [19].
6. Conclusions
We have presented new differentially private algorithms for selecting the best amongst several
differentially private algorithms. Our algorithm is near-optimal in terms of privacy overhead,
computational cost and utility loss. We have shown how it applies to hyperparameter search and
adaptive data analysis. We leave open the question of improving the constants in the run time of
our threshold finding algorithm.
While random search is a surprisingly effective way to do hyperparameter optimization in machine
learning [23], there are more complex adaptive algorithms that often do better. Our work says that
random search- or grid search-based hyperparameter tuning can be made differentially private
essentially for free. It is natural to ask if we can make the various adaptive algorithms differentially
private.
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Appendix A. Deferred Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1. We restate Theorem 3.1 here for convenience.
Theorem A.1. Fix any ε1 > 0, ε0 ∈ [0, 1], δ1 > 0, γ ∈ [0, 1]. Let T be any integer such that
T ≥ max
{
1
γ ln
2
ε0
, 1 + 1eγ
}
, Then Algorithm 1 with these parameters satisfies the following:
(a) Let Aout(D) be the output of Algorithm 1, then
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)] ∝ Pr
(x˜,q˜)∼Q(D)
[(x˜, q˜) = (x, q)].
(b) If Q is ε1-DP, then the output is (2ε1 + ε0)-DP.
(c) If Q is (ε1, δ1)-DP, then the output is
(
2ε1 + ε0, 3e
2ε1+ε0 · δ1γ
)
-DP.
(d) Let T˜ be the number of iterations of the algorithm, and let p1 = Prq∼Q(D)[q ≥ τ ], then
ET˜ ≤ 1
p1(1− γ) + γ ≤ min
{
1
p1
,
1
γ
}
.
(e) Furthermore, Pr[output ⊥] ≤ (1−p1)(1+ε0/2)p1 γ.
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Proof. For part (a), let p(x, q) := Pr(x˜,q˜)∼Q(D)[(x˜, q˜) = (x, q)]. Given a threshold τ , we let p1 =
Prq∼Q(D)[q ≥ τ ], and p′1 = Prq∼Q(D′)[q ≥ τ ]. Then we have
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)] =
T∑
j=1
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q) ∧ stops after j steps]
=
T∑
j=1
((1− p1)(1− γ))j−1 · p(x, q)
=p(x, q) · 1− ((1− p1)(1− γ))
T
1− (1− p1)(1− γ) .
Note that p1 only depends on τ and not on (x, q), and γ is a constant, therefore we have Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)] ∝
p(x, q).
For part (b), since Q is ε1-DP, we have that p1 is ε1-close to p
′
1, and 1 − p1 is also ε1-close to
1− p′1. Let p′(x, q) := Pr(x˜,q˜)∼Q(D′)[(x˜, q˜) = (x, q)], then we also have p(x, q) is ε1-close to p′(x, q).
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)]
Pr[Aout(D′) = (x, q)]
=
p(x, q)
p′(x, q)
· 1− ((1− p1)(1− γ))
T
1− ((1− p′1)(1− γ))T
· 1− (1− p
′
1)(1− γ)
1− (1− p1)(1− γ)
≤ exp(ε1) · 1
1− (1− γ)T ·
p′1(1− γ) + γ
p1(1− γ) + γ
≤ exp(ε1) · 1
1− ε0/2 · exp(ε1), if T ≥
1
γ ln
2
ε0
≤ exp(2ε1 + ε0), if ε0 ≤ 1.
Next we consider the event of outputting ⊥ on dataset D.
Pr[Aout(D) = ⊥] =
 T∑
j=1
Pr[Aout(D) = ⊥ ∧ stops after j steps]
+ Pr[not stopping after T steps]
=
 T∑
j=1
((1− p1)(1− γ))j−1 · (1− p1)γ
+ ((1− p1)(1− γ))T
=(1− p1)γ · 1− ((1− p1)(1− γ))
T
1− (1− p1)(1− γ) + ((1− p1)(1− γ))
T
=
(1− p1)γ − (1− p1)T+1(1− γ)Tγ + (1− p1)T (1− γ)T − (1− p1)T+1(1− γ)T+1
1− (1− p1)(1− γ)
=
(1− p1)γ + p1(1− p1)T (1− γ)T
1− (1− p1)(1− γ)
=(1− p1)γ ·
1 + p1γ (1− p1)T−1(1− γ)T
p1(1− γ) + γ .
Similarly, we have,
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Pr[Aout(D) = ⊥]
Pr[Aout(D′) = ⊥] =
1− p1
1− p′1
·
1 + p1γ (1− p1)T−1(1− γ)T
1 +
p′1
γ (1− p′1)T−1(1− γ)T
· p
′
1(1− γ) + γ
p1(1− γ) + γ
≤ exp(ε1) ·
(
1 + p1(1− p1)T−1 · 1
γ
(1− γ)T
)
· exp(ε1)
(†)
≤ exp(ε1) ·
(
1 +
1
e(T − 1)γ · (1− γ)
T
)
· exp(ε1), by AM-GM inequality
≤ exp(2ε1) · (1 + ε0/2) , if T ≥ max
{
1
γ ln
2
ε0
, 1 + 1eγ
}
≤ exp(2ε1 + ε0),
where (†) follows from AM-GM inequality: recall that T > 1 is an integer, and 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, then
(T − 1)p1(1− p1)T−1 ≤
(
(T − 1)p1 + (T − 1)(1− p1)
T
)T
=
(
1− 1
T
)T
≤ e−1.
This concludes part (b). For part (c), it is worth noting that the privacy does not degrade as we
increase T (the number of iterations).
We consider any event E on the output of Algorithm 1. Note that E will be a set of tuples
(x, q), and possibly contain ⊥. Let Aout(D) be the output of Algorithm 1 on dataset D, and
Aout(D
′) be the output on a neighboring dataset D′. If ⊥ ∈ E, then clearly Pr[Aout(D) ∈ E] =
Pr[Aout(D) ∈ E \ {⊥} ]+Pr[Aout(D) = ⊥]. In the following we will bound the two terms separately.
For the first term, we consider any event F that does not contain ⊥. Let
p := Pr
(x,q)∼Q(D)
[(x, q) ∈ F ] and p′ := Pr
(i,m,q)∼Q(D′)
[(x, q) ∈ F ] ,
p1 := Pr
q∼Q(D)
[q ≥ τ ] and p′1 := Pr
q∼Q(D′)
[q ≥ τ ] .
If Q is (ε1, δ1)-DP, then we know that p ≤ eε1p′ + δ1, and p′1 ≤ eε1p1 + δ1, or equivalently that
p1 ≥ max {0, p′1 − δ} e−ε1 . Also notice that p ≤ p1 and p′ ≤ p′1. Then, by calculations in part (a),
we have the following upperbound:
Pr[Aout(D) ∈ F ] =p · 1− ((1− p1)(1− γ))
T
1− (1− p1)(1− γ)
≤ p
p1(1− γ) + γ
≤ e
ε1 · p′ + δ1
max {0, p′1 − δ1} · e−ε1(1− γ) + γ
≤ e
2ε1 · p′ + eε1δ1
max {0, p′1 − δ1} · (1− γ) + γ
.
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Furthermore we have the following lowerbound:
Pr
[
Aout(D
′) ∈ F ] =p′ 1− ((1− p′1)(1− γ))T
1− (1− p′1)(1− γ)
≥p′ 1− (1− γ)
T
p′1(1− γ) + γ
≥p′ 1− ε0/2
p′1(1− γ) + γ
, if T ≥ 1γ ln 2ε0
≥ e
−ε0 · p′
p′1(1− γ) + γ
, if ε0 ≤ 1
Then for an event F = E \ {⊥} (that is, F does not contain ⊥), we have
Pr[Aout(D) ∈ F ]− e2ε1+ε0 · Pr
[
Aout(D
′) ∈ F ]
≤e2ε1p′ ·
(
1
max {0, p′1 − δ1} · (1− γ) + γ
− 1
p′1(1− γ) + γ
)
+
eε1δ1
max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ
≤ e
2ε1δ1p
′(1− γ) + eε1δ1(p′1(1− γ) + γ)
(max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ) (p′1(1− γ) + γ)
≤ e
2ε1δ1(2p
′
1(1− γ) + γ)
(max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ) (p′1(1− γ) + γ)
, by p′ ≤ p′1
≤2e
2ε1δ1
γ
.
Next, notice that we also have 1−p1 ≤ eε1(1−p′1)+δ1, then for the output ⊥ we can upperbound
Pr[Aout(D) = ⊥] =(1− p1)γ ·
1 + p1γ (1− p1)T−1(1− γ)T
p1(1− γ) + γ
≤(1− p1)γ ·
1 + 1e(T−1)γ (1− γ)T
p1(1− γ) + γ , by AM-GM inequality
≤(eε1(1− p′1) + δ1) γ · 1 + 1e(T−1)γ (1− γ)Te−ε1 max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ , by (ε1, δ1)-DP
≤(eε1(1− p′1) + δ1) γ · 1 + ε0/2e−ε1 max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ , by the choice of T
≤e
2ε1+ε0(1− p′1)γ + eε1+ε0δ1γ
max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ
.
And we lowerbound
Pr
[
Aout(D
′) = ⊥] =(1− p′1)γ · 1 + p
′
1
γ (1− p′1)T−1(1− γ)T
p′1(1− γ) + γ
≥(1− p′1)γ ·
1
p′1(1− γ) + γ
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Therefore we have
Pr[Aout(D) = ⊥]− e2ε1+ε0 · Pr
[
Aout(D
′) = ⊥]
≤e2ε1+ε0(1− p′1)γ
(
1
max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ
− 1
p′1(1− γ) + γ
)
+
eε1+ε0δ1γ
max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ
=
e2ε1+ε0δ1γ · (1− p′1)(1− γ)
(max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ) (p′1(1− γ) + γ)
+
eε1+ε0δ1γ
max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ
≤ e
2ε1+ε0δ1γ · ((1− p′1)(1− γ) + p′1(1− γ) + γ)
(max {0, p′1 − δ1} (1− γ) + γ) (p′1(1− γ) + γ)
≤e
2ε1+ε0 · δ1
γ
.
Finally, for an event E that contains ⊥, we let F = E \ {⊥}, and then
Pr[Aout(D) ∈ E]− e2ε1+ε0 · Pr
[
Aout(D
′) ∈ E]
= Pr[Aout(D) ∈ F ] + Pr[Aout(D) = ⊥]− e2ε1+ε0 ·
(
Pr
[
Aout(D
′) ∈ F ]+ Pr[Aout(D′) = ⊥] )
≤2e
2ε1δ1
γ
+
e2ε1+ε0 · δ1
γ
≤3e2ε1+ε0 · δ1
γ
.
For part (d), notice that in each iteration, in order to not halt, q has to be below τ , and the
γ-biased coin test did not pass. In other words, for each iteration, Pr[halting in any iteration] =
1− (1− p1)(1− γ) = p1(1− γ) + γ. Therefore this can be stochastically dominated by a geometric
distribution (which corresponds to setting T = ∞), with expected number of trials being at most
1
p1(1−γ)+γ .
For part (e), by direct calculations,
Pr[output ⊥] =(1− p1)γ ·
1 + p1γ (1− p1)T−1(1− γ)T
p1(1− γ) + γ
≤(1− p1)γ ·
1 + 1e(T−1)γ (1− γ)T
p1
, by AM-GM inequality
≤(1− p1)(1 + ε0/2)
p1
γ.

A.2. Proof of Theorem 3.5. For convenience we restate Theorem 3.5.
Theorem A.2. Fix any ε0 ∈ (0, 1/2), γ ∈ [0, 1], δ2 > 0 and let T =
⌈
1
γ
(
ln 2(1+γ)
2
ε0γ2
+ ln ln 2(1+γ)
2
ε0γ2
)⌉
.
Consider a variant of Algorithm 2 that outputs the highest scored candidate from S if j reaches T .
If Q is ε1-DP, then the output of this algorithm is (3ε1 + 3ε0)-DP.
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2: let Aout(D) be the output of Algorithm 2 on D, then
we have
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)]
=
T∑
j=1
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q) ∧ |S| = j]
=
T∑
j=1
Pr[|S| = j] · Pr[maxS ≤ q, and (x, q) ∈ S | |S| = j]
=
T∑
j=1
(1− γ)j−1 γ · Pr[maxS ≤ q, and (x, q) ∈ S | |S| = j]
+ (1− γ)T · Pr[maxS ≤ q, and (x, q) ∈ S | |S| = T ] .
Then, observe that
Pr[maxS ≤ q | |S| = j] = (1− p0)j ,
and
Pr[(x, q) ∈ S | maxS ≤ q, and |S| = j] = 1−
(
1− p
1− p0
)j
= 1−
(
1− p1
1− p0
)j
.
Together we have
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)] =
T∑
j=1
(1− γ)j−1 γ · ((1− p0)j − (1− p1)j)
+ (1− γ)T ((1− p0)T − (1− p1)T ) .
(2)
We denote a := (1− γ)(1− p0), b := (1− γ)(1− p1), then
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)]
=
γ(1− p0)
(
1− aT )
1− a −
γ(1− p1)
(
1− bT )
1− b + a
T − bT
=
γp+
(
(1− p1)(1− p0)γ2 − p0p1γ
)
(bT − aT )− γ(p1aT − p0bT )
((1− p0)γ + p0) ((1− p1)γ + p1) + a
T − bT .
Observe that a− b = (1− γ)p, and we have
aT − bT =
T−1∑
i=0
aT−ibi − aT−i−1bi+1 = (a− b)
T−1∑
i=0
aT−i−1bi ≤ T (a− b)aT−1.
Using the upper bound on a, this also implies that
aT − bT ≤ Tp(1− γ)T .
Furthermore, ∣∣p1aT − p0bT ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣p1aT − p0aT ∣∣+ ∣∣p0aT − p0bT ∣∣
≤paT + Tp(1− γ)T · p0(1− p0)T−1
≤p(1− γ)T + T
e(T − 1)p(1− γ)
T , by AM-GM inequality
≤2p(1− γ)T .
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And we also have
((1− p0)γ + p0) ((1− p1)γ + p1) ≤ (1 + γ)2∣∣(1− p1)(1− p0)γ2 − p0p1γ∣∣ ≤ γ(1 + γ).
Now, if T ≥ 1γ
(
ln 2(1+γ)
2
ε0γ2
+ ln ln 2(1+γ)
2
ε0γ2
)
, then we have T (1 − γ)T ≤ ε0γ
(1+γ)2
. Therefore we can
upperbound
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)]
=
γ(1− p0)
(
1− aT )
1− a −
γ(1− p1)
(
1− bT )
1− b + a
T − bT
≤γ(1− p0)
1− a −
γ(1− p1)
1− b +
ε0γp
(1 + γ)2
≤ γp(1 + ε0)
((1− p0)γ + p0) ((1− p1)γ + p1) .
The first inequality above is a consequence of upper bounding the sum of the first T terms in eq. (2)
by the sum to infinity. Then we lowerbound
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)]
=
γp+
(
(1− p1)(1− p0)γ2 − p0p1γ
)
(bT − aT )− γ(p1aT − p0bT )
((1− p0)γ + p0) ((1− p1)γ + p1) + a
T − bT
≥
γp− ε0γ21+γ p− 2γ
2ε0
T (1+γ)2
p
((1− p0)γ + p0) ((1− p1)γ + p1)
≥
γp− γ+3γ2
(1+γ)2
ε0γp
((1− p0)γ + p0) ((1− p1)γ + p1)
≥ γp(1− ε0)
((1− p0)γ + p0) ((1− p1)γ + p1) .
Finally,
Pr[Aout(D) = (x, q)]
Pr[Aout(D′) = (x, q)]
≤ p
p′
· p
′
0(1− γ) + γ
p0(1− γ) + γ ·
p′1(1− γ) + γ
p1(1− γ) + γ ·
1 + ε0
1− ε0 ≤ exp(3ε1 + 3ε0).

A.3. Proof of Lemma 4.3. We re-state Lemma 4.3 below for convenience.
Lemma A.3. Let {X1, · · · , Xn} and {Y1, · · · , Yn} be two sequences of independent {0, 1} random
variables, and let X =
∑n
i=1Xi, Y =
∑n
i=1 Yi. For any fixed ε1 ∈ (0, 1), ε0 ∈ (0, 1), δ0 ∈ (0, 1), let
C = 2(eε0+ε1 + 1 + eε0/2) < 21.
If EX ≤ eε1EY , then under the trivial (independent) coupling between X and Y ,
Pr
[
X ≥ eε1+ε0 · Y + C
ε0
· ln 2
δ0
]
≤ δ0.
Equivalently, if we let ∆ :=
C ln 2
δ0
ε0(eε0+ε1−1) = O
(
1
ε20
ln 1δ0
)
, then
Pr
[
X + ∆ ≥ eε1+ε0 · (Y + ∆) ] ≤ δ0.
Before proving this lemma, it will be useful to show the following concentration bounds.
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Lemma A.4. Let X be a sum of independent {0, 1} random variables: X = ∑ni=1Xi as defined
in Lemma 4.3, then ∀ε ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
[
X ≥ eεEX + e
ε + 1
ε
ln
1
δ
]
≤ δ.(3)
Proof. Let ∆1 =
eε+1
(eε−1)2 ln
1
δ , then we apply the standard Chernoff bound to X + ∆1:
Pr[X + ∆1 ≥ eε · E(X + ∆1) ] ≤ exp
(−(eε − 1)2E(X + ∆1)
eε + 1
)
≤ exp
(−(eε − 1)2∆1
eε + 1
)
= δ.
By re-arranging, we get that
Pr
[
X ≥ eεEX + e
ε + 1
ε
ln
1
δ
]
≤ Pr
[
X ≥ eεEX + e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ln
1
δ
]
= Pr[X ≥ eεEX + (eε − 1)∆1] ≤ δ.

Lemma A.5. Let Y be a sum of independent {0, 1} random variables: Y = ∑ni=1Xi as defined
in Lemma 4.3, then ∀ε ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
[
Y ≤ e−εEY − ln
1
δ
ε
]
≤ δ.(4)
Proof. Note that by a direct application of Chernoff bound, it holds that ∀δ ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
Y ≤
1−
√
2 ln 1δ
EY
 · EY
 ≤ exp(−(2 ln 1δEY ) · EY2
)
= δ.
Then, by AM-GM inequality: ∀ε, we have εEY2 +
ln 1
δ
ε ≥
√
2EY · ln 1δ . Moreover, by standard
estimates: for ε ∈ (0, 1), we have 1− ε ≤ e−ε ≤ 1− ε/2. Therefore, ∀ε ∈ (0, 1), δ ∈ (0, 1),
Pr
[
Y ≤ e−εEY − ln
1
δ
ε
]
≤Pr
[
Y ≤ EY −
(
εEY
2
+
ln 1δ
ε
)]
≤Pr
[
Y ≤ EY −
√
2EY · ln 1
δ
]
, by AM-GM inequality
= Pr
Y ≤
1−
√
2 ln 1δ
EY
 · EY

≤δ.

Finally, we are ready to prove Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. For any given ε0, δ0, we set ε = ε0/2, and δ = δ0/2. Then we consider the
following events, GX and GY on the probability space of X and Y respectively:
GX :=
{
X : X < eεEX +
eε + 1
ε
ln
1
δ
}
;
GY :=
{
Y : Y > e−εEY − ln
1
δ
ε
}
.
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As discussed in Lemmas A.4 and A.5, we have
Pr
[
GX ∪GY
]
≤ Pr
[
GX
]
+ Pr
[
GY
]
≤ δ + δ = δ0.
On the other hand, conditional on GX and GY , we must have
X <eεEX +
eε + 1
ε
ln
1
δ
, by GX
≤eε+ε1EY + e
ε + 1
ε
ln
1
δ
≤e2ε+ε1
(
Y +
ln 1δ
ε
)
+
eε + 1
ε
ln
1
δ
, by GY
=eε0+ε1 · Y + 2(e
ε0+ε1 + 1 + eε0/2)
ε0
ln
2
δ0
Therefore, let C = 2(eε0+ε1 + 1 + eε0/2), then
Pr
[
X ≥ eε0+ε1 · Y + C · ln
2
δ0
ε0
]
≤ Pr
[
GX ∪GY
]
≤ δ0.

Appendix B. Naive algorithms: tight examples and analysis
B.1. Outputting the best candidate. In this subsection we consider a naive algorithm where,
one simply chooses the best candidate (with the highest score, e.g., in the hyperparameter selection
setting, among the trained models one outputs the best performing model and its corresponding
hyperparameter).
What is the best ε-DP bound, or (ε, δ)-DP bound that we can hope for? Basic composition
theorem says that if there are K candidates, and each candidate is ε-DP, then, outputting the best
of the K candidates is (Kε)-DP. This is actually tight, thanks to the following example.
let m ∼Mi(d1), and qi(m) =

0.9, if i = 0
0.8, if i 6= 0 and with probability 12
0.95, if i 6= 0 and with probability 12
let m ∼Mi(d′1), and qi(m) =

0.9, if i = 0
0.8, if i 6= 0 and with probability eε2
0.95, if i 6= 0 and with probability 1−eε2
Here the probability are with respect to the randomness in the ε-DP candidate M . Then for
neighboring datasets d1 and d
′
1, we get K samples of the candidates (e.g. for each of the K
candidates, we draw a sample), and then we compare the event of choosing i = 0 as the best
hyperparameter. It is easy to see that Pr[i∗(d1) = 0] = 2−K and Pr[i∗(d′1) = 0] = exp(Kε) · 2−K ,
therefore,
ln
∣∣∣∣Pr[i∗(d′1) = 0]Pr[i∗(d1) = 0]
∣∣∣∣ = Kε.
What about (ε, δ)-DP bound? We show that outputting the maximum cannot do better than(
Θ(ln 1δ )ε, δ
)
-DP. Fix an integer K, and δ ∈ (0, 1).
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let m ∼Mi(d1), and qi(m) =

0.9, if i = 0
0.8, if i 6= 0 and with probability 1− ln 1/δK
0.95, if i 6= 0 and with probability ln 1/δK
let m ∼Mi(d′1), and qi(m) =

0.9, if i = 0
0.8, if i 6= 0 and with probability 1− e−ε ln 1/δK
0.95, if i 6= 0 and with probability e−ε ln 1/δK
Again for neighboring datasets d1 and d
′
1, we get K samples of the candidates (e.g. for each of the
K candidates, we draw a sample), and then we compare the event of choosing i = 0 as the best
hyperparameter. It is easy to see that Pr[i∗(d1) = 0] ≈ δ and Pr[i∗(d′1) = 0] ≈ δ1−ε, therefore,
ln
∣∣∣∣Pr[i∗(d′1) = 0]− δPr[i∗(d1) = 0]
∣∣∣∣ ≈ ln(δ−ε − 1) ≈ (ln 1/δ) ε.
B.2. Thresholding with decreasing thresholds. In this subsection we consider a natural vari-
ant of Algorithm 1: in each iteration, instead of halting (and output ⊥) with probability γ, what
if we decrease the threshold? In particular, we will try a lower threshold with probability at least
γ in each step. Is this good enough, so that we can avoid paying the privacy cost for the different
thresholds that we tried along the way? See Algorithm 6 for formal description. For simplicity,
we consider the special case where we do not stop the algorithm after some finite number of T
steps. The algorithm could run forever in the worst case. Note that in Algorithm 1, running the
algorithm longer only helps in privacy (recall that in Theorem 3.1, the larger T is, the smaller ε0
we can choose).
Algorithm 6 Thresholding with decreasing thresholds.
Input: a budget γ ≤ 1, an integer R for how many thresholds to try, and the sampling access to
Q(D).
Let τ = 1;
While τ ≥ 0:
• draw (x, q) ∼ Q(D);
• if q ≥ τ then output (m, i) and halt;
• flip a γ-biased coin: with probability γ, set τ ← τ − 1R .
Note that as soon as τ = 0, the algorithm will output whichever samples of candidate that it
gets, as q ≥ τ is trivially true.
Here is an example which shows that trying many thresholds are not free for privacy: if we plan
to try R thresholds, then we do have to pay a factor of R in the privacy cost.
Consider Q(D) = Bernoulli(p), that is, q ∼ Q(D) will be 1 with probability p, and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, in order for the algorithm to ouput a candidate with score 0, the threshold has to be
decreased R times, untill τ = 0. And only then Algorithm 6 will output a score 0 candidate with
probability 1−p. Let us compute the probability of this event. Let a = (1−p)(1−γ), b = (1−p)γ.
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Pr[output 1 before the R-th decrements on D] =p
∞∑
j=0
R−1∑
i=0
(
j
i
)
aj−ibi
=p
R−1∑
i=0
bi
∞∑
j=i
(
j
i
)
aj−i
=p
R−1∑
i=0
bi
1
(1− a)i+1
=
p
1− a
1−
(
b
1−a
)R
1− b1−a
=1−
(
b
1− a
)R
.
Therefore
Pr[output 0 on D]
=(1− p) · (1− Pr[output 1 before the R-th decrements on D] )
=(1− p)
(
b
1− a
)R
= (1− p)γR ·
(
1− p
p(1− γ) + γ
)R
.
Notice that 1−pp(1−γ)+γ is monotone in p, if (1− p) changes to eε(1− p), then the eε factor will be
amplified R times.
B.3. Outputting the p-th percentile. Without loss of generality, we consider p = 12 , that is, we
output the median candidate. Also without loss of generality, let us say there are only two models,
m1 and m2, and q(m1) = 0, q(m2) = 1. Consider the following two distributions of Mi(D) and
Mi(D
′).
∀i,Mi(D) =
{
m1, with probability
1−ε
2
m2, with probability
1+ε
2
,
∀i,Mi(D′) =
{
m1, with probability
1+ε
2
m2, with probability
1−ε
2
.
Clearly, the two distributions are O(ε)-close, yet in one distribution, the median is m2, while in
the other the median is m1. Therefore, the median of the distribution is not private. This is also the
case if one takes the median of N samples, assuming N large enough (where we have concentration
with high probability). This also applies if one pick an index k from {1, 2, · · · , dN/2e} uniformly
at random, and then output the k-th highest.
Appendix C. Improved analysis of the private amplification algorithm in [19]
Let {Qi(D)}Ni=1 be a sequence of independent distributions, let {qi(D)}Ni=1 be the random vari-
ables where qi ∼ Qi.
Suppose that for some ε1, every qi is ε1-DP. For a given τ ∈ R, let q˜i = min {τ, qi}. Denote
Eε(A1, · · · , An) to be the exponential mechanism (with parameter ε) on the sequence {Ai}, which
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is a random variable. For any given γ > 0, n = N + 1 + 1γ , and Ai =
{
q˜i(D), if i ≤ N
τ, otherwise
. Then,
we consider the distribution of Eε2(A1, · · · , An). Basically, we will add 1 + 1γ dummy classes with
a score τ , scale back everything else and then apply exponential mechanism.
Theorem C.1. Fix ε2, τ , δ, γ ∈ (0, 14). Suppose that for every i, qi is ε1-differentially private.
Let p = 1N
∑N
i=1 E exp(ε2(q˜i − τ)). Then the following holds.
• Utility: The mechanism outputs a dummy class with probability γ+1Npγ+1 , and
Pr
[
Eε2(A1, · · · , An) ≥ τ −
1
ε2
ln
(
1
δp
)]
≥ 1− δ,
where the randomness is over both the internal randomness of exponential mechanism and
the randomness of {qi}.
• Privacy: Eε2(A1, · · · , An) is (2ε1 + 8γ)-DP.
It is worth noting that the privacy on the training set does not depend on ε2. In other words,
one can even set ε2 → ∞, which corresponds to sampling uniformly from the classes with a score
exceeding some threshold and with one extra dummy class. The theorem says that doing so does
not compromise the privacy of the training set at all.
Before we prove the theorem, we introduce a useful lemma similar to that of [25, Lemma C.1].
The key changes will be from a Binomial distribution to one that takes value from [0, 1].
Lemma C.2. Let {Xi}Ni=1 be a sequence of independent random variables over [0, 1], then
1
1 +
∑N
i=1 EXi
≤ E
[
1
1 +
∑N
i=1Xi
]
≤ 1∑N
i=1 EXi
.
Proof. The first inequality follows by Jensen’s inequality, since the function f(X) = 11+X is convex
for X > −1.
Next we use a formula for negative moments [6]. Note that for every u, x > 0,
u1+x
1 + x
=
∫ u
0
tx dt.
Setting u = 1 and taking expectations over x =
∑
Xi,
E
[
1
1 +
∑
Xi
]
=
∫ 1
0
E
[
t
∑N
i=1Xi
]
dt =
∫ 1
0
N∏
i=1
E
[
tXi
]
dt.
Next we show that tx ≤ (t− 1)x+ 1 for x ∈ [0, 1].
For any given t, consider the following two points: tx =
{
1, if x = 0
t, if x = 1
. Thus (t− 1)x+ 1 is the
line joining these two points. Since tx = ex ln t is convex as long as t > 0, and tx meets (t− 1)x+ 1
at the two points, we get that tx ≤ (t− 1)x+ 1 for x ∈ [0, 1].
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Therefore,
E
[
1
1 +
∑
Xi
]
=
∫ 1
0
N∏
i=1
E
[
tXi
]
dt
≤
∫ 1
0
N∏
i=1
(1 + (t− 1)EXi) dt
≤
∫ 1
0
exp
(
(t− 1)
N∑
i=1
EXi
)
dt
=
1− exp
(∑N
i=1 EXi
)
∑N
i=1 EXi
.
This concludes the proof. 
Now we are ready to prove Theorem C.1.
Proof of Theorem C.1. The probability of outputting a dummy is
E
[
(1 + 1γ ) exp(ε2τ)
(1 + 1γ ) exp(ε2τ) +
∑N
i=1 exp(ε2q˜i)
]
≤
1 + 1γ
Np+ 1γ
,
where the inequality follows from the definition of p and Lemma C.2. Then,
Pr
[
Eε2(A1, · · · , An) < τ −
1
ε2
ln
1
δp
]
≤
∑
i∈[N ]
Pr
[
q˜i < τ − 1
ε2
ln
1
δp
]
exp(ε2q˜i) · E
[
1
(1 + 1γ ) exp(ε2τ) +
∑N
j=1 exp(ε2q˜j)
∣∣∣∣∣q˜i
]
<Npδ · E
[
1
1
γ +
∑N
j=1 exp(ε2(q˜j − τ))
]
≤Npδ · 1
1
γ − 1 +
∑N
i=1 E exp(ε2(q˜i − τ))
by Lemma C.2
≤δ by definition of p.
For the privacy part, consider any two neighboring datasets D1 and D2. Let Ai = q˜i(D1), and
Bi = q˜i(D2) for i ≤ N , and Ai = Bi = τ for i = N + 1, · · · , N + 1 + 1γ . Let M1 := Eε2(A1, · · · , An),
M2 := Eε2(B1, · · · , Bn) be the random variables of the two outcomes.
For any outcome S,
Pr[M1 = S] =
N∑
i=1
Pr[Ai = S] exp(ε2S) · E
[
1
exp(ε2τ) +
∑N
j=1 exp(ε2Aj)
∣∣∣∣∣Ai = S
]
=
N∑
i=1
Pr[Ai = S] exp(ε2(S − τ)) · E
[
1
1 + 1γ + exp(ε2(S − τ)) +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Aj − τ))
]
.
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Note that by Lemma C.2,
E
[
1
1 + 1γ + exp(ε2(S − τ)) +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Aj − τ))
]
≤E
[
1
1 + 1γ +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Aj − τ))
]
≤ 1
1
γ + E
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Aj − τ))
≤ 1
1
γ + E
∑N
j=1 exp(ε2(Aj − τ))− 1
≤ 1
Np+ 1γ − 1
.
On the other hand, by Jensen’s inequality,
E
[
1
1 + 1γ + exp(ε2(S − τ)) +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Aj − τ))
]
≥ 1
1 + 1γ + exp(ε2(S − τ)) + E
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Aj − τ))
≥ 1
2 + 1γ + E
∑N
j=1 exp(ε2(Aj − τ))
≥ 1
2 + 1γ +Np
.
By symmetry we have the same bound for M2 and Bj . Therefore,
Pr[M1 = S]
Pr[M2 = S]
≤max
i∈[N ]

Pr[Ai = S]E
[
1
1+exp(ε2(S−τ))+
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Aj−τ))
]
Pr[Bi = S]E
[
1
1+exp(ε2(S−τ))+
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Bj−τ))
]

≤ exp(ε1)
Npeε1 + 1γ + 2
Np+ 1γ − 1
≤ exp(2ε1 + 8γ) .
Similarly
Pr[M1 = S]
Pr[M2 = S]
≥ min
i∈[N ]

Pr[Ai = S]E
[
1
1+exp(ε2(S−τ))+
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Aj−τ))
]
Pr[Bi = S]E
[
1
1+exp(ε2(S−τ))+
∑N
j=1,j 6=i exp(ε2(Bj−τ))
]

≥ exp(−ε1)
Npe−ε1 + 1γ − 1
Np+ 1γ + 2
≥ exp(−2ε1 − 8γ) .
This concludes the proof.
35
Appendix D. Lower Bounds
In this section, we show that our algorithms loss in parameters are close to optimal. First note
that since are competing against the best of K mechanisms, at least K oracle calls are needed, and
our algorithm makes only O˜(K) oracle calls.
When each of the input mechanisms Mi is ε-DP, our final algorithm has privacy guarantee
2ε+ ε′ where ε′ can be made arbitrarily small. Recall that in this factor of two loss occurs already
in the case when Mi is qi(·) + Lap(S/ε) for some score functions with sensitivity S: in this case
the NoisyMax mechanism has 2ε-DP, and the exponential mechanism with similar utility has the
same factor of two loss. We next argue that this factor of two loss is necessary under weak utility
assumptions. We start with a definition.
Definition D.1. Suppose that M is an algorithm that takes as input a set of ε-DP mechanisms
M1, . . . ,MK and outputs an index i. We say that i∗ is γ-dominant in M1, . . . ,MK on D if
Prmi∼Mi(d)[arg maximi = i
∗] ≥ 1 − γ. We say that M is γ-weakly useful if Pr[M(D) = i∗] ≥ γ
whenever i∗ is γ-dominant in M1, . . . ,MK on D.
The next theorem says that a fairly mild weak usefulness condition already implies that this
factor of 2 loss is unavoidable.
Theorem D.2. Suppose that M is an algorithm that takes as input a set of ε-DP mechanisms
M1, . . . ,MK , and outputs an index i. If M is γ-weakly useful for γ = K−α for a small enough
α > 0, then M cannot by εˆ-DP for any εˆ < (2− 6α)ε.
Proof. The proof is a simple packing argument. Our mechanisms Mi all have range {0, 1} and
output 1 with probability pi(D) on dataset D. We define a set of K + 1 datasets D0, D1, . . . , DK
such that:
pi(D0) =
1
2K0.5
pi(Dj) =
{
1− 12Kα if i = j,
1
2K1+α
otherwise.
It is easy to check that if D0 and Di are distance ∆ = d (0.5+α) lnKε e, then theMi’s can be extended
to satisfy ε-DP. Moreover, any 1Kα -weakly useful algorithm on dataset Di should output i with
probability at least 1Kα . Suppose that M is εˆ-DP. Then,
Pr[M(D0) = i] ≥ exp(−∆εˆ) · 1
Kα
.
Since
∑
i Pr[M(D0) = i] ≤ 1, it follows that for some i, this probability Pr[M(D0) = i] ≤ 1K . It
follows that
− lnK ≥ −∆εˆ− α lnK
⇔ εˆ ≥ (1− α) lnKd((0.5 + α) lnK)/εe .
For large enough K, this implies that εˆ ≥ 2(1− 3α)ε. 
Appendix E. Useful Properties of Differential Privacy
In this section, we prove some folklore properties of the distance implicit in the definition of
differential privacy that are useful. We start with a definition of closeness.
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Definition E.1. For distributions P and Q, we say that P is (ε, δ)-far from Q, if for all events S,
Pr
x∼P
[x ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr
x∼Q
[x ∈ S] + δ
We say that P ≡ε,δ Q if P is (ε, δ)-far from Q and Q is (ε, δ)-far from P .
Lemma E.2. Suppose that P ≡ε,δ Q for δ < 110 . Then for any ε′ > ε, there is an event B such
that (a) Prx∼P [x ∈ B] ≤ δ/(1 − exp(ε − ε′)), and (b) P | Bc ≡ε′,0 Q | Bc. In particular, setting
ε′ = ε+
√
2delta, we get PrP [B] ≤
√
δ.
Proof. Without loss of generality2, the distributions have a density function. Let B = {x : PrP [x]PrQ[x] ≥
exp(ε′)}. Now note that
Pr
P
[B] ≤ exp(ε) Pr
Q
[B] + δ ≤ exp(ε) exp(−ε′) Pr
P
[B] + δ,
so that PrP [B] ≤ δ/(1− exp(ε− ε′)). Setting ε′ = ε+
√
2δ, and noting that exp(−√2δ) ≤ 1−√δ
for δ < 110 , the claim follows.

Lemma E.3. Suppose that there is an event B such that P | Bc ≡ε,0 Q | Bc, and that Prx∼P [B] ≤
δ. Then P ≡ε,δ Q.
Proof. Let S be any event. Then
Pr
P
[S] ≤ Pr
P |Bc
[S] + Pr[B]
≤ exp(ε) Pr
Q|Bc
[S] + Pr[B]
≤ exp(ε) Pr
Q
[S] + δ.

2This can be ensured by having the mechanism outputting a uniform [0, 1] r.v. in addition to its original output.
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